National Identity and Attitude Toward Foreigners in a Multinational State: A Replication

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An analysis of the 1995 Belgian General Election Survey indicates that the bipolar national identity variable, which contrasts citizens who identify exclusively with the Belgian nation with those who identify exclusively with the Flemish or Walloon subnation, measures not only the direction but also the intensity of national feelings. Respondents who are located at the middle of the scale tend to have a weak identification with both the nation and the subnation. On the basis of a structural equations modeling approach involving a test of the construct equivalence in the two regions and a control for agreeing-response bias, it is shown that the bipolar national identity variable and attitude toward foreigners are inversely related in Flanders and Wallonia. In Flanders, citizens with a strong subnational identification tend to have a negative attitude toward foreigners; those with a strong Belgian identification are more positive. This relationship became more pronounced after controlling for the respondents’ level of education. In Wallonia, a reverse but less pronounced relationship was found. These findings support the hypothesis that the relationship between the variables of national identity and attitude toward foreigners is not intrinsic, but is at least partly determined by the social representation of the nation.

KEY WORDS: national identity, ethnocentrism, social identification, social representations

In states where citizens are faced with two competing nationalities, national identity is often operationalized as a bipolar variable: The citizens who exclusively identify with either the national (e.g., Spanish) or the subnational (e.g., Catalonian) entity are located at the extremes, whereas those who identify with
both nationalities are located in the middle (e.g., Moral, 1998, pp. 38–44; Moreno, Arriba, & Serrano, 1998). The latter group is usually described as having a multiple national identity, but it is not always clear what this means. The concept of a multiple national identity can be interpreted to imply that a citizen has a double sense of national belonging—for instance, sharing the Spanish identity with those who exclusively identify themselves as Spanish and the Catalan identity with those who exclusively identify themselves as Catalan. An alternative interpretation is that “bi-national” citizens are simply indifferent with regard to the nationality issue. They take a middle position not because they value both nationalities equally, but because they have a weak identification with the nation as such, be it Spain or Catalonia. The implication of the latter interpretation is that the bipolar scale can be collapsed into a unipolar scale measuring the intensity of attachment to the nation. The findings presented below, based on Belgian survey data, support the second interpretation.

A related concern of this article is the relationship between the bipolar national identity variable and citizens’ attitude toward foreigners. To the extent that the former variable measures the intensity of national identity, as described above, it can be hypothesized that the citizens at either extreme of the scale will be more hostile toward the relevant outgroups of the national ingroup (i.e., foreigners): The more a citizen identifies with the nation, the more he or she will tend to contra-identify with foreigners. This hypothesis of an intrinsic relationship between national identity and attitude toward foreigners can be traced back to Sumner (1906, pp. 27–30), who considered outgroup aggression and ingroup identification as basically correlative. However, this view is now generally considered too extreme, as social-psychological research has shown that social identification (i.e., the sense of belonging to an ingroup) does not require a contra-identification with a salient outgroup (e.g., Brewer & Miller, 1996, pp. 47–48). The implication with regard to national identity is that citizens may have a strong identification with the nation without adopting a hostile attitude toward foreigners.

An alternative hypothesis is that the relationship between national identity and attitude toward foreigners is determined by the social representation of the nation—that is, by the shared images and beliefs about the national ingroup and its relationship to other groups or “foreigners” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 39). In the case of an ethnic-cultural representation—involving a vision of the nation as a community of citizens sharing a common cultural heritage—we would expect an intense identification with the nation to coincide with a negative attitude toward foreigners, being perceived as a threat to the national culture. Conversely, in the case of a civic or republican representation1—involving a vision of the

1 Similar distinctions between ethnic and civic nationalism can be found throughout the literature on nationalism. For a recent overview, see Brown, 1999.
nation as a dynamic community of equal citizens who are bound by and committed to a basic contract, irrespective of their culture or descent—an intense national identity would be expected to coincide with a positive attitude toward foreigners.

The Case of Belgium

Belgium is a telling example of a state whose citizens are faced with two competing projects of nation-building. The most obvious national identity is still the official Belgian one, but the main subnational entities, Flanders and Wallonia, 2 acquired a substantial amount of autonomy during the last decades and increasingly promote a specific “national” identity. The federal authorities portray Belgium as a civic nation that celebrates the value of cultural diversity and allows citizens with different cultures to live together in harmony. The Flemish identity, on the other hand, appears to be associated with the protection of the Flemish cultural heritage—in particular the Dutch language—and hence with a more defensive attitude toward other cultures. Conversely, the Walloon identity is primarily associated with the social-economic emancipation of the Walloon region and also with openness toward other cultures and anti-racism (Van Dam, 1996). In Flanders, there is a strong extreme right party that is rooted in the Flemish nationalist movement and favors Flemish independence. In Wallonia, the extreme right is more marginal and fragmented.3 The largest extreme right party continues a tradition of ethnic-cultural Belgian nationalism and is averse to Walloon regionalism. The representation of the Belgian identity is thus less homogeneous in Wallonia, where the official civic representation is interfered with by the ethnic-cultural representation of the extreme right.4

Following the social representation hypothesis, it is expected that in Flanders, the citizens who intensely identify with Flanders will tend to have a negative attitude toward foreigners, whereas those who intensely identify with Belgium will tend to be more positive toward foreigners. This means that a clear linear relationship between the bipolar national identity variable and attitude toward foreigners is expected. The relationship between attitude toward foreigners and the bipolar national identity variable is expected to be more diffuse in Wallonia, because the representations of the Belgian and the Walloon identity are

\[\text{The third entity, Brussels, is left aside in this study. The situation there is more complex, because the Flemish and Francophone “communities” have authority over the Flemish and Francophone institutions that develop activities in the domain of “personalized” affairs (culture, education, well-being) in Brussels. This is one of the reasons why Brussels cannot be put on the same footing as the Flemish and Walloon “subnations.”}\]

\[\text{The Front National obtained 5.5\% of the Walloon votes in the 1995 parliamentary elections.}\]

\[\text{For a more detailed description of the Belgian, Flemish, and Walloon identities, see Maddens et al., 2000.}\]
less distinct. However, assuming that the official civic image of Belgium is somewhat tainted by the ethnic-cultural representation by the extreme right, it can be expected that a negative attitude toward foreigners will tend to coincide with an intense Belgian rather than Walloon identification, the relationship thus being reversed compared to Flanders.

This social representation hypothesis was supported by earlier research on the Belgian case, based on 1991 survey data (see Maddens, Billiet, & Beerten, 2000). In this article, the hypothesis is tested on the basis of more recent survey data and a more sophisticated statistical method, involving a style factor controlling for agreeing-response bias (see Billiet & McClendon, 2000).

Data and Measurements

The analysis is based on the Belgian General Election survey carried out after the 1995 parliamentary elections by ISPO and PIOP (the Inter-university Centre for Political Opinion Research at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Université Catholique de Louvain, respectively). The staged random selection in 1995 contained 2,099 Flemings and 1,258 Walloons between 18 and 75 years of age. Voters in Brussels are not included in the analysis reported here. The Flemish voters were interviewed in Dutch; the Walloons in French.

Indicators for Attitude Toward Foreigners

This concept was operationalized using a set of opinion items expressing subjective feelings of threat by immigrants of (mainly) Turkish or Moroccan origin. The survey contained a balanced scale with three positively worded and three negatively worded statements to control for acquiescence (Billiet & McClendon, 2000). The three positive items related to the view that immigrants contribute to the country’s prosperity (prosperity), that the presence of several cultures is enriching (enriching), and that immigrants are welcome (welcome). Of the three negative indicators, two expressed the attitude of feeling threatened by immigrants belonging to a religious minority in the domains of culture and customs (culture) and employment (employ); the third item tried to capture distrust of immigrants (distrust). Table 1 shows the question wording of the items regarding attitude toward foreigners, together with information about the percentages of respondents that agreed or completely agreed with each item.

Indicators for National Identity

The 1995 election survey contains five items that can be used to construct a latent bipolar national identity variable. Respondents were asked whether they felt exclusively or predominantly Flemish/Walloon, felt exclusively or predominantly Belgian, or equally identified with both (exclus_id). Respondents were also asked
to rank-order various political entities according to their identification with them (first_id). Three other items measured opinions on state reform in Belgium. These are regarded as proxy questions for national awareness: Respondents were asked to indicate on an 11-point scale to what extent important decisions in the Belgian state should be taken at a regional level (decisions); they were also asked to indicate on a 5-point scale (from “completely agree” to “completely disagree”) their opinion on the split of the social security system between the regions (soc_sec). Finally, respondents in Wallonia and Flanders were asked a different question on the opposition between independence and the unitary state (independ), because the researchers wished to take the differences in public opinion in the two regions into account. Respondents in Flanders were asked to what extent they agreed with the commitment to independence for Flanders as a policy objective. Respondents in Wallonia, by contrast, were asked to what extent they agreed with a policy focused on ending the division of Belgium. This question was regarded as a functional equivalent. The question wordings and response distributions on these indicators are reported in Table 2.

The Interpretation of the Middle Position in the Bipolar Scale

The alternative hypotheses about the relationship between national identity and attitude toward foreigners in Belgium were based on the assumption that respondents who take a middle position on the bipolar national identity scale have a weak identification with the nation as such, be it Belgium or Flanders/Wallonia. This implies that the bipolar variable captures not only the direction but also the intensity of national feelings.

This assumption can be tested on the basis of a separate measurement in the ISPO data of the intensity of the feelings (strong, moderate, weak) toward Belgium and Flanders/Wallonia, respectively. If the bipolar variable taps inten-
A simple bivariate cross-tabulation of the separate intensity items with the standard item measuring multiple identities (exclus_id)—which has the highest loading on the bipolar construct (see below)—shows linear relationships and moderate correlations. In Flanders, 55% of those who mainly or exclusively feel Flemish do so strongly. This strong feeling decreases to 15% among those who feel mainly or exclusively Belgian. In the middle position of the scale (“as much Flemish as Belgian”), more than 60% of the respondents have weak Flemish feelings ($r = .33$). The same pattern holds for the strength of feeling Belgian, but the relationship is weaker ($r = -.21$). About 45% who mainly or exclusively feel Belgian do so strongly. This decreases to 21% among those who mainly or exclusively feel Flemish. About 57% of those in the middle position (“as much Flemish as Belgian”) feel moderately Belgian. The same conclusion holds for the Walloon
sample, but the correlations are weaker than in the Flemish sample (.20 and −.17, respectively). The majority of the respondents in the middle have moderate feelings. Among those who exclusively or mainly feel Belgian, more people feel strongly Belgian (54%) than in Flanders, but among those who mainly or exclusively feel Walloon, the proportion of those who feel strongly Walloon is less pronounced (41%).

An analysis on the basis of the latent national identity construct, modeled below, yields similar results. The relationships between a weighted composite scale (i.e., a linear combination of the five indicators of national identity, which is transformed into a 10-point scale) and the intensity of feelings toward Belgium and Flanders/Wallonia are linear. Among the respondents with the lowest two scores (Belgian pole), about 20% express strong feelings toward Flanders. This amount increases to 25% in the middle position and to 60% among the respondents with the highest two scores (Flemish pole). At the same time, the proportion of respondents with strong feelings toward Belgium drops from 57% among the respondents at the Belgian pole of the scale to 30% in the middle position, and to 21% among the Flemish respondents with high scores (Flemish pole of the scale). The picture for the strength of feelings toward Wallonia is less clear. The proportions of Walloon respondents with strong feelings toward Wallonia do not vary strongly according to position on the bipolar national identity scale, but the respondents with weak feelings are more concentrated in the middle of the scale. Strong feelings toward Belgium are much more pronounced (68%) among Walloon respondents with low scores (Belgian pole of the scale) than in the middle (40%) and on the other side of the scale (24%). We may thus conclude that the bipolar national identity variable measures the intensity of national feelings as well as the direction.

Methods

In cross-cultural comparative research, it is vitally important to test whether constructs that are deemed to measure the same concept are equivalent and have the same meaning in the different cultural groups. We start from the hypothesis of complete invariance of the measured constructs in the two groups, or “metric invariance” (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998, p. 80). This means that we assume that all indicators measured in the two survey populations have precisely the same relationship with the constructs. Only the variances of the latent variables are not assumed to be equal because, after inspecting the distributions of the observed variables in Table 2, there is no reason to assume that these are equal. This means that we do not test the model of complete factorial invariance, which implies that the variances of the latent variables are also equal (Rensvold & Cheung, 1998). The covariance between the two latent variables, however, is constrained to be equal at the start. This assumption is only tested after the measurement model is fixed because this is the crucial test in this study.
As shown below, the assumption of complete measurement invariance is too rigid for the construct “bipolar national identity.” That concept does not have exactly the same meaning in Flanders and Wallonia, but it is quasi-equivalent. The measurement of “attitude toward foreigners,” by contrast, seems to be completely equivalent in the two populations. The covariances between the two latent variables are not equal (see below).

To investigate the measurement of our construct in the two populations, we have used a structural modeling approach of confirmatory factor analysis. The constructs are equivalent when the factor loadings of the observed indicators on the latent variables and their residual variances are identical in the two groups (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Rensvold & Cheung, 1998). To evaluate the equality of the factor loadings in several groups, we tested measurement models concerning one or more latent variables (or constructs).

In general, the measurement model for $m$ indicators and $n$ latent variables in one population is given by

$$ y = \Lambda \eta + \varepsilon $$

(Bollen, 1989, pp. 16–20, 182), where $y = (y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_m)$ are the observed variables or indicators, $\Lambda$ is an $m \times n$ matrix of regression coefficients $\lambda_{ij}$, $\eta = (\eta_1, \eta_2, \ldots, \eta_n)$ are the unobserved (or latent) variables, and $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2, \ldots, \varepsilon_m)$ are the error terms (or residual variances). It is assumed that the latent variables and the error terms are random variables with zero means, the error terms are uncorrelated with the latent variables, and all observed variables are measured in deviations from their means. The measurement model represents the regression of $y$ on $\eta$, and the element $\lambda_{ij}$ of $\Lambda$ is the partial regression coefficient of $\eta_j$ in the regression of $y_i$ on $\eta_1, \eta_2, \ldots, \eta_n$. The measurement model implies that the covariance matrix of $y$ is

$$ \Sigma = \Lambda \Psi \Lambda' + \Theta \varepsilon $$

where $\Psi$ and $\Theta \varepsilon$ are the covariance matrices of $\eta$ and $\varepsilon$, respectively (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a, p. 121).

In a situation in which the equivalence of the constructs in two groups is evaluated, the test procedure starts with setting all the corresponding parameters equal over the $g$ groups ($\Lambda^1 = \Lambda^2; \Psi^1 = \Psi^2; \varepsilon^1 = \varepsilon^2$). Commonly used statistics for evaluating the fit of the model are the $\chi^2$ statistic, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the normed fit index (NFI), and the general goodness-of-fit index (GFI) (Bollen & Long, 1992; for an overview, see van de Vijver & Leung, 1997, p. 101). Step by step, constrained parameters that are responsible for large deviations from the observed covariance matrix are relaxed until a statistically acceptable and theoretically meaningful model for all groups is obtained.

There are several options when non-invariant items are detected. First, the items can be eliminated from the scale, but this atheoretical approach poses problems when only a few items are left. Second, one can accept the idea of partial
factorial invariance (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989). Invariant indicators may be retained if the researcher can argue that they have an insignificant effect on the outcome of the analysis. Finally, the failure to assess complete invariance can lead to the conclusion that the construct has a substantially different meaning in some groups analysis (Rensvold & Cheung, 1998).

Because the observed indicators are all ordinal scales, we use the estimation procedure for ordinal variables in case of sufficiently large samples suggested by Jöreskog (1990). Weighted least squares estimation (WLS) is used with the asymptotic covariance matrix of polychoric correlations. WLS is an asymptotically distributed free fit function (Bollen, 1989, p. 426; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993b, p. 21). Because we are testing the measurement equivalence of two cultural groups, the “thresholds” of the observed variables are first computed for data in the two samples together, and then fixed in each sample when the correlations and covariance matrices are computed, as is also recommended by Jöreskog.

**Results**

*Testing for Construct Equivalence*

Attitude toward foreigners was measured by a balanced set of items. As argued by several methodologists, there is considerable evidence that items in Likert format can be susceptible to an agreeing-response bias called acquiescence. This agreeing-response bias can be defined as the tendency to agree with statements or questions, independent of their content. Billiet and McClendon (2000) have shown that it is possible to use structural equations modeling to control for this type of response effect. They specified an extra style factor (or common method covariance) that substitutes a number of previously unidentified error covariances. The style factor was very strongly correlated (.90) with the sum of agreements on all indicators of both attitude toward immigrants and political distrust (Billiet & McClendon, 2000, pp. 623–625). The identification of this response effect, however, requires that the attitude scale has been balanced. This means that it should contain a more or less equal number of positively and negatively worded items. Respondents with a tendency toward “yes-saying” will agree with the positively as well as the negatively worded items.

We first examine whether an agreeing-response bias can be discerned in the two cultural groups concerned. This implies that we first check whether there is an intracultural method effect on the Likert items that are used for the measurement of attitude toward foreigners (the balanced set of six items). If this is the case, we can also evaluate whether there is a method bias in the cross-cultural sense—in other words, whether the method effect differs across countries. After all, it is not unlikely that respondents from different cultures differ in their susceptibility to an agreeing-response bias. Either way, controlling for acquiescence will lead to a more valid assessment of the equivalence of the construct of interest.
For this analysis, two random samples of about equal size are used ($N_1 = 963, N_2 = 932$). In Table 3, two completely factorial invariant (constrained) models are compared, a model without the style factor and a model with a style factor. All the factor loadings are invariant over the two groups. There are no error covariances and no cross-loadings. The variances of the latent variables are free and equal over the groups, but the covariances of the two substantive factors with the style factor are fixed to zero in the two groups ($\psi_{1,3}^1 = \psi_{1,3}^2 = 0; \psi_{2,3}^1 = \psi_{2,3}^2 = 0$). In this basic model, the covariances between the two substantive factors are constrained to be equal ($\psi_{1,2}^1 = \psi_{1,2}^2$). This constraint is further tested below.

We can see that in model B, the $\chi^2$ value decreases about 55 units for a loss of one degree of freedom. The fit indices are all much better in model B than in model A. On both statistical and theoretical grounds, the model with a style factor is apparently preferable. It is possible to obtain a better fitted model without a method factor, but not without accepting a large number of error covariances. From a theoretical point of view, a model in which most of the residual covariances can be replaced by an identifiable and theoretical meaningful common source is superior to a model with a large number of non-identifiable correlated errors.

Starting from model B, some constraints are relaxed before the measurement equivalence is investigated (see Table 4). As already mentioned, the variances of the two substantive latent variables are not constrained to be equal over the groups (model C). It is necessary to relax the equality constraints on the factor loadings of the question about social security ($\lambda_{2,1}^2 \neq \lambda_{2,1}^1$), and the corresponding error variances ($\varepsilon_{2}^2 \neq \varepsilon_{2}^1$) (model D). Moreover, in model E the error terms of the two indicators in Likert format of the first set of indicators are equal, but not zero $[\text{cov}(\varepsilon_{2,1})^2 = \text{cov}(\varepsilon_{2,1})^1 \neq 0]$. It is acceptable that these two items, with a common format that differs from the other three items, have some error variance in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>$p$ value of close fit</th>
<th>NFI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model A: factorial invariant; no style factor</td>
<td>640.71</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.391</td>
<td>.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model B: factorial invariant; style factor</td>
<td>585.73</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td>.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 The much larger Flemish sample was randomly split into two parts. The first part was used for exploration of the measurement model. The other part was used in the final test on equivalence. Because the estimation method that was used (WLS) only accepts pairwise deletion of missing values, the final samples used in the test are somewhat smaller.

6 In structural equations modeling, models with RMSEA values larger than 0.05 and $p$ values of close fit not close to 1.0 are not acceptable. The $\chi^2$ value should also not be much larger than three times the number of degrees of freedom. The $\chi^2$ statistic is much larger in the starting model. Moreover, the NFI should be close to 1.0. In this model it is 0.92, which is too low (Bollen, 1989; Bollen & Long, 1992).
common. In the model finally selected, the covariances between the two substantive concepts are not constrained to be equal in the two groups (model F). This model is borderline acceptable (RMSEA = 0.051). No improvements of the fit can be made without releasing parameters in a theoretically unsound way.

The measurement part of model F is shown in the upper part of Table 5. Several remarks can be made with regard to this model. The factor loadings of the indicators of attitude toward immigrants are completely invariant over the two groups. The variance of the style factor and all factor loadings are equal and invariant. This means that the six items that measure attitude toward immigrants are equally affected by the method factor, and that this bias is the same in the two cultural groups. As mentioned earlier, we know that the style factor measures acquiescence because it is strongly correlated with the sum of agreements on all indicators of both attitude toward immigrants and political distrust (Billiet & McClendon, 2000, pp. 623–625). The factor loadings on the style factor are low (all about .17), but this is what we expected because we did not primarily want to measure a style factor with these indicators, but rather a substantive concept.

The question about social security (soc_sec) has a substantially different loading in the two populations: .58 in the Flemish sample and .29 in the Walloon sample. Clearly, the opinion about splitting the social security system is not useful as an indicator of national identity in Wallonia. It is understandable that the opinion about splitting the social security system has a much weaker relationship with the latent national identity variable in Wallonia than in Flanders. Whereas the Flemish believe that they will take advantage of splitting social security, the Walloons fear a welfare loss in their region, hence the hesitation among the Walloon regionalists about this issue. This difference with regard to the social security issue indicates that the national identity concept is not entirely equivalent in the two regions. In both groups, the four remaining indicators have load-

### Table 4. Step-by-Step Testing of the Models With a Style Factor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>p value of close fit</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>$\Psi_{1,1}^1 (t_{1,2})^1$</th>
<th>$\Psi_{1,1}^2 (t_{1,2})^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model C: $\Lambda^1 = \Lambda^2; \Theta^1 = \Theta^2$; $\psi_{1,2}^1 = \psi_{1,2}^2; \psi_{1,3}^1 = \psi_{1,3}^2 = \psi_{2,3}^1 = \psi_{2,3}^2$</td>
<td>512.46</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.984</td>
<td>-.002 (-.067)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model D: Model C and $\lambda_{1,1}^1 \neq \lambda_{1,1}^2$; $\epsilon_{1,1}^1 \neq \epsilon_{1,1}^2$</td>
<td>491.13</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.985</td>
<td>-0.013 (-.532)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model E: Model D and $\text{cov}(\epsilon_{1,1}, \epsilon_{1,2}) = \text{cov}(\epsilon_{2,1}, \epsilon_{2,2}) \neq 0$</td>
<td>366.45</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>-.022 (-1.175)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model F: Model E and $\psi_{1,1}^1 \neq \psi_{1,2}^2$</td>
<td>355.46</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.989</td>
<td>.05 (1.96)</td>
<td>-.06 (-2.13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ings between .57 and .77, and we may conclude that the measurement of our theoretical concept “national identity” is valid. The standard multiple identity item (exclus_id) has the highest value (.77) in both groups.

Relationship Between National Identity and Attitude Toward Foreigners

The measurement model is based on assumptions about the linear relationships between the indicators and the latent variables, as well as between the latent variables themselves. The goodness of fit of the model and the amount of explained variance in the indicators is an indication that this assumption is correct for the indicators. Testing the assumption of linearity for the relation between the two latent variables, national identity and attitude toward foreigners, is more problematic because the kind of relationship (linear or curvilinear) is already presumed by the hypotheses. The intrinsic hypothesis assumes a curvilinear relationship, the negative attitude toward foreigners being weakest in the center of the national identity scale. The social representation hypothesis presumes linear relationships in opposite directions. Therefore, before calculating the correlation between the two latent variables, we must show that the application of a linear model is acceptable.

To inspect the relationship between the two latent variables, we constructed additive scales in which the indicators were weighted on the basis of the information in the measurement model. These additive scales are optimal representations of the latent variables. A visual analysis of the plot of the two variables indicates that the assumption of a curvilinear relationship between attitude toward foreigners and national identity is very improbable. This means that the intrinsic hypothesis is not very likely. A linear relationship seems more probable.

The variances of the two latent variables (constructs) and their covariances (correlations) in the two populations are given in the lower part of Table 5. The variances of the two latent variables are about the same in both regions.

Our hypothesis deals with the covariances (or correlations) between the concepts of national identity and attitude toward foreigners in the two groups. Table 4 shows the final step in which the equal-covariance model (model D: $\psi_{12}^1 = \psi_{12}^2$) is tested against the selected model (model F: $\psi_{12}^1 \neq \psi_{12}^2$). The drop in $\chi^2$ is about 11 units for a loss of one degree of freedom. The decrease is thus not that large, but it is significant. The correlations between the two substantial variables are statistically significantly different from zero ($p < .01$), have different absolute values, and have signs in opposite directions (see lower part of Table 5). This indicates that the direction of the relationship between the two latent variables is different in the two populations: a positive relation in Flanders and a negative one in Wallonia. This was expected on the basis of the social representation hypothesis.

These correlations are reversed in sign but rather low (.09 in Flanders and -.10 in Wallonia). It can be concluded that the correlations are substantial, albeit rather weak, and that they are in the expected directions: In Flanders, negative
feelings toward foreigners tend to coincide with a sense of Flemish identity, whereas in Wallonia those feelings tend to coincide with a sense of Belgian identity. However, contrary to expectations, the correlation is not stronger in Flanders. Previous research has shown that both national identity and attitude toward foreigners are influenced by age and education. Higher educated and younger citizens tend to be more positive toward foreigners (e.g., Billiet & Loosveldt, 1998). In addition, Flemish and Walloon (sub)national feelings are stronger among the higher educated, and in Wallonia also among the younger (Maddens, Beerten, & Billiet, 1994). Thus, in Flanders, people with higher education are both more likely to identify with Flanders rather than Belgium and less likely to feel threatened by foreigners, while at the same time, as shown above, negative attitude toward foreigners increases as identification with Flanders intensifies. This relationship leads us to expect that the correlation between national identity and attitude toward foreigners will increase after controlling for education. We do not expect this in the Walloon population, as the correlations there are in agreement because of the reversed correlation between national identity and attitude toward foreigners.

### Table 5. Measurement Model for Attitude Toward Immigrants, National Identity, and Tendency to Agree (Response Style) in the Flemish and Walloon Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>( \Lambda_1 ): Flanders</th>
<th>( \Lambda_2 ): Wallonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAT_ID</td>
<td>MIGRANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Independ</td>
<td>.57 (fixed)</td>
<td>.57 (fixed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Soc_sec</td>
<td>.58 (19.33)</td>
<td>.29 (8.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Decide</td>
<td>.72 (21.60)</td>
<td>.72 (21.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. First_id</td>
<td>.77 (21.49)</td>
<td>.77 (21.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Distrust</td>
<td>.81 (fix)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Employ</td>
<td>.78 (39.98)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Culture</td>
<td>.74 (35.85)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Prosperity</td>
<td>–.74 (–42.16)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Enriching</td>
<td>–.75 (–38.39)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Welcome</td>
<td>–.713 (–37.34)</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlations**

| | NAT_ID | MIGRANT | STYLE | NAT_ID | MIGRANT | STYLE |
| | 1.0 (10.90) | 1.0 (33.10) | –.10 (–2.6) | 1.0 (31.21) |
| MIGRANT | .09 (1.96) | 1.0 (33.10) | –.10 (–2.6) | 1.0 (31.21) |
| STYLE | .0 | 0 | 1.0 (5.09) | .0 | 0 | 1.0 (5.09) |

\( \chi^2 = 355.43; \text{ df} = 102; \text{ RMSEA} = .051; \text{ p} \text{ value of close fit} = 1.0; \text{ NFI} = .989 (N_1 = 963, N_2 = 932) \)

**Note.** Standardized factor loadings (common metric), correlations between the latent variables (factors), and critical ratios (t values) are in parentheses. Non-invariant parameters are in bold.
As seen in Table 6, these expectations are largely met. The effect parameters (regression coefficients) show that, in Flanders, the higher educated have both a more positive attitude toward foreigners and a stronger identification with Flanders. In Wallonia, age is clearly the more important determinant of national identity, with young respondents substantially more inclined toward the Walloon identity.7 As could be expected, sensitivity to acquiescence increases with age in both populations. It can also be seen that, when both variables are controlled for, we obtain a stronger correlation in Flanders (.17) than in Wallonia (−.10), which is in line with our hypotheses. Clearly, the Flemish correlation was somewhat hidden because of the reverse effect of education on national identity and attitude toward foreigners: Higher education has a positive effect on Flemish identity and a negative effect on ethnocentrism, thus weakening the positive relationship between Flemish identity and ethnocentrism.

### Discussion and Conclusions

In countries where citizens must cope with two different nationalities, national identity is often conceived as a bipolar variable, pitting the citizens who exclusively identify with the nation against those who exclusively identify with the subnation. Respondents who are located at the middle of the scale are usually considered to have a multiple national identity. However, our analysis of the 1995 Belgian General Election Survey data indicates that the citizens in the middle tend to have a weak identification with the nation as such, be it Belgium or Flanders/Wallonia. The implication is that the bipolar variable measures not only the direction but also the intensity of national feelings.

For that reason, it can be expected that the respondents at either extreme of the scale will be more negative toward foreigners, assuming that there exists an intrinsic relationship between identification with the national ingroup and contra-

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**Table 6. Relationship Among National Identity, Attitude Toward Immigrants, and Response Style, Controlled for Education and Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th></th>
<th>Wallonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NAT_ID</strong></td>
<td><strong>ETHNO</strong></td>
<td><strong>STYLE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td>.31 (8.33)</td>
<td>−.35 (−9.0)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE</strong></td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>.10 (2.58)</td>
<td>.23 (3.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td>.17 (3.94)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>−.10 (−2.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAT_ID-ETHNO</strong></td>
<td>(ψ₁,2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Standardized regression coefficients and correlations; t values are in parentheses.*

---

7 The zero relationships between the two background variables and ethnocentrism are difficult to understand, unless these are the result of the introduction of the style factor or the use of a balanced scale. This requires further investigation.
identification with the national outgroup (i.e., foreigners). An alternative hypothesis is that the relationship is not intrinsic but dependent on the social representation of the national identity. From this perspective, it is to be expected that an intense identification with a nation that is defined in ethnic-cultural terms will coincide with a more negative attitude toward foreigners, whereas an intense identification with a nation that is defined in civic or republican terms will tend to coincide with a more positive attitude toward foreigners.

The Belgian case lends support to this second hypothesis. On the basis of a structural modeling approach, involving a test of the construct equivalence in the two regions and a control for agreeing-response bias, it was shown that Flemish respondents who strongly identify with Flanders tend to be more negative toward foreigners, whereas those who strongly identify with Belgium tend to be more positive. In Wallonia, a reverse relationship is found: The more the Walloons identify with Wallonia, the more positive their attitude toward foreigners; the more they identify with Belgium, the more negative. In addition, when age and education are controlled for, the relationship is found to be stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia.

The differences in the ways the Belgian, Flemish, and Walloon nations are socially represented offer a plausible explanation for this reversed relationship. The Flemish nation is predominantly represented in ethnic-cultural terms, in the sense that the national identity tends to be viewed as a static cultural heritage that must be defended against outside threats. The Belgian nation, by contrast, is increasingly defined as a civic nation that allows citizens with different cultural backgrounds to live together in harmony. In Wallonia this official vision of the Belgian nation is partly thwarted by the fact that the extreme right party, albeit small, explicitly plays the Belgian card and defines Belgium in ethnic-cultural terms. At the same time, Wallonia is predominantly portrayed as a civic nation. The fact that there is not such a clear distinction between the ways the nation and the subnation are socially represented in Wallonia helps to explain why the relationship between the bipolar national identity variable and attitude toward foreigners is weaker in that region.

Our findings obviously do not provide conclusive evidence that the relationship between national identity and attitude toward foreigners is determined by the representation of the nation. We can only argue that this is a plausible explanation for the pattern found in the Belgian data. A decisive test of the hypothesis would require a more comparative approach involving a wider range of cases. Another issue for further research concerns the causal connection between national identity and attitude toward foreigners. It could be argued that national identity is the more deep-seated attitude that determines attitude toward foreigners, which would imply that a change in the presentation of the nation will influence attitude toward foreigners among the group of those who identify with the nation. On the other hand, assuming that identification with the nation is more volatile in a multinational context, it can also be hypothesized that national
identity is causally preceded by attitude toward foreigners. This would mean that citizens will choose the nation whose representation matches their values, and that a change in the presentation of the nation will cause a shift in the national allegiances of the citizens.

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REFERENCES


