

On the territoriality principle and Belgium's linguistic future

A reply

Philippe Van Parijs
UClouvain, Chaire Hoover d'éthique économique et sociale

No, my Francophone critics did not band together to reject the linguistic territoriality principle as atavistic nonsense. No, my Flemish critics did not frantically converge to proclaim the linguistic untouchability of Flemish soil. On the contrary, of all my critics, it is Helder De Schutter who attacks the territoriality principle in the most resolute and systematic way: in sharp opposition to my central argument in its favour, he claims that the implementation of this principle “clashes with equal dignity for those whose language is not supported” (De Schutter §1). At the opposite end of the spectrum, it is François Grin who states most plainly that he “fully concurs” with me on “the usefulness and legitimacy of territorial solutions” (Grin §4). Indeed he finds that the exceptions I allow room for make the territoriality arrangement I support “strikingly weak, exposing the language it is supposed to preserve to relentless pressure from a larger, possibly hegemonic language” (§2).

This uncustomary fact is a good omen: evidence that suggests that we are here having a real, honest intellectual debate, driven by a genuine attempt to articulate and understand sensible arguments from all sides, and not a tactical replication of the ethnic line up to be found in political negotiations, nor a routine rehearsal of community-specific prejudices that make the position heralded by whomever is speaking entirely predictable once we know which language he happened to learn as a toddler. This does not mean that all disagreements have shrunk effortlessly into insignificance under the lens of impartial and informed academic reason. But decisive steps towards a consensus can be made, providing one takes the trouble to clear up misunderstandings about what it is exactly that is being argued for and against and to work out whether remaining disagreements are about normative or about factual matters, about the aims to be pursued (and their relative importance) or about the means best suited to achieve them.

This is the objective pursued in the following pages, in which I try to take up in orderly fashion what I believe to be my critics' central points (§§ 1-8) and which I shall close with a prescriptive picture of Belgium's linguistic future far more explicit than the few hints contained in the lead piece (§§ 9-12). I am most grateful to all six of my critics for thoughtful comments that made me see various issues in a different light and forced me to sharpen the formulation of what I believe to be justified and why.

1. Territoriality is not homogeneity

In the title of the lead piece, I used the phrase “linguistic territoriality principle” because it is commonly used in the Belgian, Canadian or Swiss debate in order to refer to setups akin to what I am advocating. In the text itself, I spoke instead of a “linguistic territoriality regime”, and in chapter 5 of my book *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World* (Van Parijs 2011a, henceforth referred to as *LJ*), I adopted the more convoluted but more precise expression “territorially differentiated coercive linguistic regime”, often abbreviated, for convenience, as “territorial regime”. In contrast to what I propose calling an accommodating regime, a coercive regime is a set of rules that constrains the choice of the language to be used in public communication and public education. Henry Tulkens (§1) aptly highlights this terminological shift from “principle” to “regime”, and welcomes it because “principle” suggests too easily a justification based on some fundamental “right of the soil”, whereas a regime, he rightly points out, is just a set of rules. He wishes, however, that I had offered “a well-ordered set of rules”, rather than a rather fuzzy sequence of illustrations.

I sympathize with this aspiration, but could not possibly satisfy it, because of the necessarily pragmatic, context-specific nature of any sensible answer to the question of what these rules should be. For reasons stated in the lead piece, a concern for justice as equal dignity requires coercive rules that are sufficiently powerful to stabilize a vulnerable language against displacement through the operation of what I call the “maxi-min dynamics”, i.e. the mutual reinforcement of probability-sensitive language learning and the systematic use, in everyday communication, of the language best known by the speech partner who speaks it least well.⁶ But how much coercion is needed and in what form in order to achieve this is highly sensitive to the particular context. Very little, if anything, is needed to stabilize French in Wallonia, for example, as long as most of the people who settle there come with a significant prior knowledge of French *and* face an environment in which competence in French is close to a survival condition given how few Walloons can communicate smoothly in any language but French. Far more is needed in a context — familiar enough to anyone acquainted with the Flemish core of Belgium’s language quarrels — in which settlers have hardly any prior knowledge of the local language and can rely on a high level of competence of the local population in their own native language. There is no need to coerce people into doing what they do spontaneously. For this reason, the degree of coerciveness of the rules that make up a justifiable territorial regime can vary widely.

Note also that, as rightly stressed by Grin (§1), a territorial regime can be quite complex. In particular, it does not necessarily consist in protecting a single language. The opposition between a territorial and a plural regime, central in Helder De Schutter’s comments, can therefore be misleading. Contrary to what he suggests (§3), there is a territorial regime in place in the Brussels Region for example, admittedly not one that protects Dutch against French, but one that protects both against, say, Arabic (the Region’s second mother tongue, after French, in the younger generations) or against English (the second best known language, after French, in all generations except the oldest): you cannot get administrative documents, public education or political participation in Arabic, for example, even if numbers would seem to justify it: there are after all more Arabophones in half a dozen Brussels communes than Germanophones in the nine communes of Belgium’s German-speaking Community. Thus, how coercive (i.e. non-accommodating) a language regime is and should be is a matter of degree along many dimensions (*LJ* §5.1), one of them simply being the number of languages

⁶ This maxi-min dynamics, whose understanding is essential to the justification of territorial regimes and to the discussion of linguistic justice issues generally, is briefly explained in §2 of the lead piece and extensively discussed in *LJ* §§ 1.3-1.7. In this more extensive discussion, I go a long way towards accepting the various qualifications insightfully formulated by François Grin (§3).

that are being protected by the regime. In most cases, there is only one, but there can in principle be more.

In all cases, however, a territorial regime, as I understand it, stops short of regulating private communication. As noted by Van Velthoven (§1), it must therefore be clearly distinguished from linguistic homogeneity and even more from exclusive monolingualism at the individual level. It is perfectly compatible not only with the preservation of languages distinct from the official language, but also with the encouragement of their intergenerational transmission and of thriving cultural activities using those languages. Consequently, as argued by Velaers (§2), even a territorial regime protecting a single official language is perfectly compatible with a sensible interpretation of the European convention on minority rights. It can in principle countenance not only tolerance for linguistic diversity but even public support for it, for example through the subsidizing of cultural life in non-official languages (say, Francophone associations or Arabophone libraries) or through the use of some of them as a medium of teaching in part of the curriculum (as in so-called immersion schools). What matters is only that the regulation of public education and public communication should sufficiently constrain the maxi-min dynamics so as to secure universal competence in the common official language.⁷

2. Territoriality against freedom?

The core of my argument in favour of a territorial regime in the sense thus clarified is framed in terms of equal dignity (or equal respect, or parity of esteem). None of my critics challenges the importance of this normative concern. But whether this concern does much to justify a territorial regime is challenged by some of them. I shall consider this challenge in §§ 7-8 below. But I first need to say something about a number of distinct concerns, not all entirely reducible to equal dignity, which are appealed to in several of the comments, whether in favour of the position I defend or against it.

Firstly, as emphasized most explicitly by Helder De Schutter (§1), there seems to be a clash between territoriality and freedom. A territorial regime is a coercive regime. When it is binding, it prevents people from doing what they would otherwise choose to do. It is of course in the nature of institutions, including just institutions, to coerce people into doing some things (paying taxes, for example) and not doing other things (dumping pollutants, for example). It does not follow that justice and freedom are distinct values which clash with one another. As argued at length in an earlier book (Van Parijs 1995, chapter 1), just institutions do not shrink (real) freedom but essentially consist in distributing it in a fair way. Once equal dignity is made part of justice, so the core of my argument goes, some constraints on the use of language are justified: not on private communication at home, in associations or in the streets, but in publicly recognized education — where they are not intrinsically different from the obligation to teach mathematics for example — and in public communication — where they operate more as constraints on the language the citizens can expect to be understood and addressed

⁷ A territorial regime shaped by considerations of this type is perfectly consistent with the removal of some silly features of Belgium's current linguistic regime, such as the obligation to write all road signs, including those carrying the names of towns, in the official language of the region in which the sign stands. It is about time that one should start writing all over the country "Antwerpen" (rather than "Anvers"), "Liège" (rather than "Luik"), "Leuven" (rather than "Louvain"), "Tournai" (rather than "Doornik") etc. This would not only help reduce confusion, mockery and irritation among foreign travellers. Calling a town by the name it is given in the mother tongue of its inhabitants rather than in our own is one of the many ways, and a particularly easy one, in which respect for the other national language can be expressed.

in than on the language in which they are allowed to express themselves. Unlike the right not to go the opera — with which De Schutter (§1) suggests what is in my view a misleading analogy —, neither the right not be taught at school in a particular language nor the right to be listened and talked to in one's preferred language belongs to any sensible list of inalienable fundamental liberties.

3. Territoriality against democracy?

Secondly, as stressed above all by Henry Tulkens (§2), there seems to be a clash between territoriality and democracy. I explained and illustrated in a recent collection of essays (Van Parijs 2011b) how I see the relationship between justice and democracy. In a nutshell, among the millions of ways in which a democracy — thinly defined by the conjunction of universal suffrage, majority rule and free voting — could be organized, one must select those that are most conducive to the realization of justice duly specified. This is admittedly quite different from the view held by many economists, to the effect that the standard by which democratic decision-making is to be extent to which the decisions it produces satisfy the citizens' given tastes over the set of public goods under the control of the democratic entity concerned. The assumption *De gustibus non disputandum*, thus taken for granted in the standard economic approach, is rejected in the view I defend, variants of which have been articulated by a long line of political philosophers, from Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls to Joshua Cohen or Jon Elster. According to this view, democracy is to be conceived and shaped as the framework of a deliberative process that *transforms* preferences in order to produce substantively just decisions, rather than as the best feasible tool for revealing pre-existing individual preferences or interests for public goods broadly defined, aggregating them and satisfying them as well as possible.⁸

An optimal democratic design, from such a standpoint, cannot be one that lets each neighbourhood or each municipality decide what its linguistic regime is going to be any more than what its tax regime is going to be, though for significantly different reasons. Letting the dwellers of each portion of a territory regularly decide by a simple majority what its linguistic regime is going to be would turn any linguistic regime into an accommodating regime, be it with an inbuilt time lag. By contrast, what a territorial regime amounts to doing is make it realistic to expect that people who settle in the territory concerned will have the courage and humility to learn the local language. If they do not muster this courage or humility and simply wait for their numbers to grow until they manage to twist democratically the local linguistic regime in an accommodating direction, whatever contribution a territorial regime may make to justice as equal dignity is being undermined.

As emphasized by both Van Velthoven (§1) and Velaers (§2), border fixity is essential to the territorial principle.⁹ Because the institution of a territorial regime is not driven by some absurd “right of the soil”, there is an unavoidable arbitrariness in the drawing of the border, but the systematic shifting of this border as the outcome of local democratic decisions or linguistic censuses must be ruled out. By no means does it follow — it hardly needs saying — that democracy has no role to play. In this sense, Henry Tulkens (§2) is fully justified in wishing me, to his perceptible relief, “welcome to the [democratic] club”. However, I claim that the borders and their fixity must be part of a deal

⁸ I take Tulkens (2009: 2) to express his commitment to one version of the latter view when he writes that “the fundamental value of democracy [...] is understood as adequacy *vis-à-vis* the people's preferences ». Whether or not he would confirm this commitment on due reflection, this “aggregative” (versus “deliberative”) conception of democracy is widely shared, and by no means absurd.

⁹ Even the so-called “dynamic linguistic territoriality principle” described by Stojanovic (2010) as applying to the (very rural) Romansch area of Switzerland — and favourably referred to by Tulkens (2009) — ascribes to a linguistic community that is a local *minority* the power to preserve a coercive regime that protects its language.

democratically adopted on a higher scale, guided by a conception of justice that incorporates equal dignity and enlightened by a lucid analysis of how the maxi-min dynamics threatens this equal dignity in a context of linguistic inequality.¹⁰ Some will protest that such a set up would be “less democratic” than one that leaves it up to each local entity to determine its linguistic regime. I am perfectly willing to concede this. But as I argue at length elsewhere (Van Parijs 2011b) and as a little bit of reflection should make plain, optimal democracy and maximal democracy are far from being one and the same thing.

4. Territoriality and ethnic pacification

A third important concern in this discussion is pacification. Along with Jan Velaers (§1), I believe that territorial regimes with fixed borders help pacify relations between linguistically distinct groups both across and within state boundaries. Helder De Schutter (§1) challenges this view. Given that many places are multilingual, drawing a linguistic border is likely to be contentious and can lead to sharp linguistic conflict. I shall certainly not deny that drawing such borders can be tricky, and I devote quite a bit of space to this issue in my book (*LJ* §§5.12-5.13). Temporary linguistic facilities and a firm commitment on the part of the local linguistic majority to make proficiency in the official language accessible to all local children growing up with a different mother tongue are necessary but often not quite sufficient conditions for securing peace (as well as justice) in the many situations in which no clean cut is possible.

However, I cannot see how anyone could deny that in Belgium, as in many other places in the world, the sometimes painful and laborious introduction of a territorial regime has done much to achieve lasting pacification. De Schutter (§3) seems to deplore that a coercive territorial regime put an end to the accommodation of Francophone minorities in Flemish cities. But can he deny that the linguistic situation quickly became more peaceful there than in those places where an accommodating regime survived, in particular in Leuven owing to the presence of the country’s main Francophone university (until the late 1960s) and all around Brussels owing to the lack of fixity of the linguistic border (until the early 1960s), to the preservation of limited electoral and judiciary facilities in a large part of Flemish Brabant (until now) and to the concession of more extensive administrative and educational facilities in six suburban communes? As illustrated more than established by Belgium’s linguistic history, lasting pacification is a welcome likely consequence of a well-designed territorial regime. But this fact, if verified, is not central to my argument. The foundation on which the latter rests is justice as equal dignity. For peace cannot be bought at the expense of justice. Justice is the most fundamental value.

5. Territoriality and resistance against hegemony

Before turning to this key issue of equal dignity, a few more words on two other arguments used by some of my commentators (in addition to pacification) on behalf of territorial regimes. One is resistance to ideological domination by the culture associated with the invading language. This is a concern particularly close to François Grin’s (§3) heart, in the context of the growing dominance of

¹⁰ The reason for the rules needing to be determined on a higher scale is not that those in power at the higher level are intrinsically more able to be guided by a sense of justice, but because the territoriality principle is in the first instance about what can be legitimately expected from people settling in a particular area, and leaving up to the settlers to decide by themselves (albeit after a time lag) what can be expected from themselves would amount to pulverizing the rules which my equal-dignity-based arguments sustain are justified.

English in Europe and beyond. I do think a territorial regime of the sort I advocate does provide some protection to “weaker” languages and “smaller” cultures against drowning in the flood of what is being produced in “stronger” languages by “bigger” cultures. But Grin (§2) complains that I am not going far enough, that I am satisfying myself with an Emmentaler cheese when I should be pushing harder for a polished Modigliani surface. For the exceptions to linguistic coercion I allow may trigger the unravelling of the territorial protection. It is wrong of me to approve the growing presence of English courses in higher education¹¹, for example, or to foster the viewing of undubbed English-language films, or to recommend the creation of small “linguistically free zones” (Brussels being one obvious candidate to which I return in § 9 below) in the limited sense of being accommodating towards the global lingua franca.

Grin and I disagree on this issue and we have had other opportunities to discuss each other’s arguments.¹² As I try to argue at length elsewhere (*LJ* §§1.9-1.10), the effective pursuit of global justice is doomed in the absence of an effective mode of cross-border communication involving all layers of the population. For reasons that have nothing to do with any alleged intrinsic superiority, this medium will be English, and the democratization of competence in English is therefore a must. Some asymmetry in the degree of dissemination of the Anglophone culture versus all others is therefore unavoidable. But this is not a sufficient justice-based reason for opposing the spreading and the use of English in higher learning, for example, or in the administration of the European Union, as the impact of this asymmetry is negligible — at any rate if we non-Anglophones adopt the right attitude —, compared to the massive importance, for the prospects of worldwide justice, of being able to communicate, argue and mobilize cheaply across borders. Effective protection against ideological hegemony cannot and must not come from tightening territorial protection but from a resolute, competent, uninhibited oral and written use of the lingua franca by non-Anglophones (*LJ* §1.11). Let us all try to do as well as we can what Grin himself does so magnificently, rather than do what he says we should do.

6. Territoriality and social cohesion

Finally, there is social cohesion, which Jan Velaers (§1) considers just as important as equal dignity as “a foundation of the territoriality regime in our times”. I entirely agree with him about the centrality of this consideration, prominent, for example in a number of court decisions which he rightly quotes with approval against an overenthusiastic celebration of linguistic diversity. It is extremely important to ensure that people actively sharing a territory should also actively share a language. Democratic participation cannot be effectively institutionalized if people cannot talk to each other, nor can opportunities be equalized among citizens from all linguistic groups or feelings of solidarity develop across ethnic boundaries. It is precisely for reasons of “social cohesion” in this sense that I emphasize universal access to proficiency in the official language as a condition for the legitimacy of a territorial regime (*LJ* §§ 5.5 & 6.7).

Such reasons, distinct from equal dignity, may provide more than we need as a justice-based rationale for the coercive protection of the local language in a context in which the latter competes with

¹¹ A recurrent hot issue in Flanders. See, for example, the recent opinion piece by the Rector of the Vrije Universiteit Brussels Paul De Knop (2011) and a response by two members of the Flemish nationalist party N-VA (Van Dyck & Celis 2011).

¹² See our respective contributions to a thematic issue of the *Revue d'économie publique* (Van Parijs 2003 and Grin 2003) and our respective in-depth interviews published as an appendix to the European Commission’s “Lingua Franca” report (Grin 2011 and Van Parijs 2011c). See also *LJ* chapter 1, Appendix 2, for an extension discussion of Esperanto, which Grin advocates as an alternative to English.

“weaker”, low-status immigrant languages. But this justification is more problematic in contexts such as the one that serves as the central illustration in my book — the worldwide dominance of English — where the conflict is with a stronger, high-status language that holds the potential of becoming, beyond a more or less awkward transition period, a language shared by the whole population. No doubt the social cohesion of Ireland or of French Flanders, for example, owes far more to the local populations’ shared knowledge of English and French, respectively, than to whatever little Gaelic or Flemish they are still able to speak. It is therefore not always true that the binding idiom “cannot be anything other, at the national or regional level, than the language that has traditionally been spoken in a given area” (Velaers §1).

In the Belgian context, a concern for social cohesion can be persuasively invoked in order to justify the learning of French or Dutch by immigrants from all over the world, but not so easily to justify the learning of Dutch by Francophones or Anglophones who could easily get away with living in Flanders without learning any Dutch and communicating with locals in French or in English. If left unconstrained, such a sociolinguistic pattern would accelerate the learning by locals of these languages. It would lead to universal proficiency in the stronger non-local language after a transitional process that may prove somewhat chaotic but does not even need to be that long if backed by a facilitating set of policies in matters of migration, language use and education. Moreover, this alternative way of pursuing social cohesion would have the advantage of achieving it on a higher scale. This is unwittingly pointed out by Van Velthoven (§2) when he suggests that the territorial regime put into place in the 1930s created a pressure towards a decentralization of competences to linguistically defined entities, that it thereby triggered the breakup of Belgium’s unitary state and that it may even have sown the seeds of eventual separation.

Unity is not an aim in itself, and therefore the fact that territorially differentiated coercive regimes generate centrifugal tendencies supplies no knockdown argument against them.¹³ My point is here simply that social cohesion considerations only offer a contingent and qualified support to the linguistic territoriality principle. Appeal to some other consideration is needed if we are to justify protecting a weaker language against a stronger one that offers a realistic potential of generating social cohesion on a higher scale, as French did for example for the initially very multilingual territory of the French Republic, and as some hoped for quite a while it would do just as thoroughly for the Kingdom of Belgium.

7. Linguistic justice versus regional justice?

Thus, though plausible at first sight, arguments against territorial regimes that appeal to freedom (as incompatible with coercive institutions) or to democracy (as preference aggregation), once scrutinized, turn out to rest on feeble foundations (§§ 2-3). On the other hand, arguments in favour of territorial regimes based on pacification, cultural resistance or social cohesion,¹⁴ though not irrelevant or unwelcome, are more contingent and less cogent, in my view, than what I regard as the most general and fundamental justification of linguistic territoriality: justice as equal dignity (or parity of esteem). I shall not rehearse this justification here, but simply recall the three channels through which the set of coercive rules that define a territorial regime serve justice as equal dignity: (1) they inhibit

¹³ Not a knockdown argument, but still an argument that needs to be addressed by supporters of linguistic territoriality and of the linguistic diversity it helps preserving (see *LJ* §6.9).

¹⁴ Linguistic diversity is also often invoked in favour of linguistic territoriality but it hardly features in the comments: it is very briefly mentioned only by Grin (§§ 1 and 4). Chapter 6 of *LJ* is entirely devoted to it.

“colonial attitudes”, (2) they prevent a “kindness-driven agony” and (3) they secure a key background condition for offering each tongue the option of being “a queen” (*LJ* §§ 5.3-5.5).

One puzzling — and hence unavoidably instructive — challenge to this equal-dignity based argument came from Alain Maskens, the author of a couple of books in which he persuasively pleads for a non-ethnic Brussels identity (Maskens 2000, 2004). Maskens does not contest the importance of taking seriously, in the Belgian context, the equal dignity of communities defined by their linguistic identities. But he insists that equal dignity is also owed to people defined by their regional identities. As there is no pre-established harmony between the two concerns, a compromise is needed between the respective claims of “linguistic justice” and “regional justice”. In his view, one form this compromise could take is that of a territorial trade off, whereby the officially bilingual region of Brussels-Capital would be expanded somewhat at the expense of both officially monolingual regions — not as much as perfect regional justice would require but more than perfect linguistic justice could tolerate (Maskens §5). Alternatively and more originally, it could take the form of a nested combination, whereby the regional border would be comfortably expanded in the light of “rigorous analyses” preferably entrusted to “independent international experts”, while the present language borders would remain unaltered inside this expanded region (Maskens §6).¹⁵

Why do I find this challenge puzzling? Because I do agree that there are two conflicting sets of sensible considerations pulling in opposite directions here, while finding it weird to capture this conflict in terms of territorial claims based on linguistic justice and regional justice, respectively. At the core of my approach to territoriality lies the claim, which Maskens is not denying, that there is something about the nature of language — its being a communication tool and the associated maxi-min dynamics — that explains why equal respect for the linguistic dimension of people’s identity — unlike respect for its religious or culinary dimension, for example — requires territorial protection (see *LJ* §4.1). For the sake of linguistic justice so conceived, the borders of the relevant territories are *prima facie* best established so as to maximize, among the citizenry residing in a territory, the proportion of native speakers of the language picked as its official language, while minimizing the proportion of non-native speakers of that language. However, there is no *a priori* reason why such borders thus drawn optimally from a linguistic point of view, should also be the borders best suited for the devolution of the widest range of policy competences to decentralized entities. An efficient exercise of competences in matters of mobility, public health, town planning or taxation, for example, may be incompatible with a high level of decentralization to entities with borders drawn according to linguistic criteria. Maskens (§2) argues that this is blatantly the case in the Brussels metropolitan area, and no urban economist or geographer looking at Belgium from abroad needs much time to reach exactly the same conclusion.¹⁶

¹⁵ Because the drawing of the new border would need to be made in the light of scientific analyses about the substance of which he makes no claim, Maskens remains unavoidably noncommittal about how significant the enlargement would need to be. He does stipulate, however, that this modification of the regional border should be “acceptable in a democratic way to the populations who might be directly affected”. But it is essential to his approach that this democratic determination should be very different from the local consultation invoked in the democratic argument against linguistic territoriality (see §3 above): how small the Brussels region is kept “directly affects” the whole of the Brussels population, which should therefore have a say. Consequently, it can be taken for granted that, once operationalized, Maskens’s criterion should push out Brussels’s borders in all directions far beyond the six communes with facilities. For the sake of illustration, he asks us to imagine that the size of the region would be “multiplied by four or six” (Maskens §5). In the following discussion, I shall assume instead that the further strengthening of interdependencies through the development of the RER/GEN network will force the “rigorous analyses” to include, for instance, Leuven and Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve in the metropolitan region, and hence to recommend that Brussels’ comfortable enlargement should correspond to something like the old province of Brabant (even though a commune-by-commune approach is admittedly more likely to include Mechelen than Tienen). However, the validity of the argument below does not hinge on where exactly the border is drawn.

¹⁶ See, for example, Cheshire (2010) and Eeckhout (2011).

In order to avoid perversely inefficient decentralization, it has therefore repeatedly been proposed to expand the bilingual Brussels region far beyond its current borders so that it can include most, if not all, its metropolitan region, including the communication hubs and intellectual centres of Leuven and Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve. Most of the people making such proposals are Francophones. This is not only, I believe, because any sensible expansion on these grounds would bite far more into Flanders than into Wallonia. This is also because many Francophones simply fail to realize how much of an *attrape-nigaud* such an enlargement would be from the Flemish standpoint, even though it can correctly be presented as a relative equalization of the proportion of Dutch-speakers and French-speakers in the enlarged Brussels. What they overlook (or sometimes pretend to overlook) is that within the boundaries of this larger area, once made bilingual, the maxi-min dynamics would work at the expense of the weaker language in essentially the same way as in the smaller area of the current Brussels region. The process may be slower than in the past because the gap between the respective social statuses of the two languages has narrowed in recent decennia (as noted by Maskens §5). But it will be no less inexorable because of the lock-in nature of the maxi-min dynamics against the background of massively asymmetric bilingualism at the start. Those who seriously propose such a straightforward expansion of the bilingual Brussels region have not learned the lessons of the acute linguistic conflicts that exploded in the 1960s around the Brussels and Leuven “oil stains”, nor understood why fixed language borders, as already mentioned, are crucially important for linguistic justice as equal dignity.

Such a reproach does not apply to Alain Maskens though, at least in so far as he is asking us to take seriously the second of his two options: a substantial enlargement of Brussels to its metropolitan area *without* a matching shift in the language border (Maskens §6). This is an original proposal that is worth pondering about. But the best way to motivate it, it seems to me, is not as he does in terms of “regional justice”, or respect for the dignity of the Brusselers, versus “linguistic justice”, or respect for the dignity of the Dutch- and French-speakers, with the latter best served by a minimization of the bilingual area and the former best honoured by a territorial expansion of the Brussels region at the expense of its two neighbours. It is this direct link made between regional expansion and respect for regional *identity* (as distinct from the interests of the Brussels Region or its inhabitants) that I find puzzling. A more satisfactory way of motivating Maskens’s proposal seems to me to ask squarely the question of how best to decentralize political authority in a linguistically diverse country. On the one hand, the democratic imperative favours an option that maximizes the extent to which politics can function in the first or best language of the bulk of the people — and hence a coincidence between regional and linguistic borders. On the other hand, concern for an efficient handling of interdependencies favours an option that brings under the same authority areas that are linked by a dense set of positive and negative externalities — and hence, in the Brussels case, for regional borders that reach far beyond the linguistic borders. The current situation approximates the former option (with the six communes with facilities as the main deviation), while Maskens advocates the latter. Each of these options is in principle consistent with my equal-dignity case for a territorial regime, and each has its own advantages and drawbacks.

The main advantage of Maskens’s proposal is that it would be possible to go much further in the devolution process, because the size of cross-regional externalities, while still far from insignificant, would be less massive and ubiquitous under his proposal than they unavoidably are when one of the regions is just a city or even, as in the Brussels case, the central neighbourhood of a larger urban area. Keeping Brussels as tiny as it is now not only makes it necessary to keep Belgium alive. It means that we shall have to keep a federal Belgian state with far more substance than we could otherwise get

away with. This general point was neatly illustrated in the context of a very instructive workshop on Brussels hosted by the K.U.Leuven research centre VIVES (16 June 2011). The organizers warmly recommended a recent book by Harvard economist Edward Glaeser, whom they had attempted to invite for the occasion. After explaining why cities systematically tend to attract lots of poor people and reaffirming the great importance of redistribution for the sake of both social justice and economic efficiency, Glaeser illustrates in his book how disastrous it can be for cities to deal with redistribution themselves: “*A nation's poor are every citizen's responsibility*”, he writes, “*not just the people who happen to live in the same political jurisdiction. It is fairer, both to the poor and to cities, if social services are funded at the national rather than the local level.*” (Glaeser 2011: 258). Not everyone at the workshop may have heard this with delight. But a point is sometimes more readily heard, grasped and believed when yelled from across the Atlantic: no tiny Brussels without a robust Belgium.

For those who are sensitive to the many advantages of decentralization, both general and specific to linguistically diverse countries, this is a major drawback of the current small-Brussels option and a major advantage of Maskens’ alternative. Yet, as things stand in the 21st century, the latter is a non-starter. In large measure because the Brussels *francophonie* could not be trusted to do what Maskens proposes, namely grant territorial protection to Dutch language in the bulk of Brussels’ hinterland, the dissolution of Belgium’s unitary state has involved the attribution to the other two regions of 95% of the old province of Brabant, thanks to Brussels the wealthiest area of Belgium since its inception and now more than ever. Owing to the ejection of the UCL from Leuven and to other aspects of the linguistic protection of the Flemish vicinity of Brussels, Brabant wallon has now emerged, along with Vlaams Brabant, as the (per capita) richest province in the country. At the same time, as a result of several decennia of growing autonomy, the Flemish and Walloon regions have gained in both authority and identity. Can we really expect them to willingly donate to the Brussels region the wealthiest chunks of their territories, namely the parts of the province of Brabant they managed to claim as theirs in the regionalization process? Or can one expect a strong Belgian or even European government to force them to give up under threat what they would not willingly donate? The not very philosophical answer to these questions is no. And the philosophical footnote would be that no “regional injustice” would thereby be perpetrated, providing of course the Belgian federal state remains firmly in charge of the competences with strong cross-regional externalities, not least the key redistributive powers.

Moreover, it is not too difficult to turn this necessity into a virtue. Firstly, preserving the coincidence between regional and linguistic borders has the advantage of giving a clearer message about the area in which citizens are expected to integrate by learning the same one official language, instead of giving the impression that there is a grey area (the monolingua portion of a bilingual area) in which this is only half expected: the implementation of the territorial regime would be facilitated as a result. Secondly, the absolute necessity of keeping more powers at the central level owing to the small size of the central urban component of the federation generates a structural pressure to maintain a more generous solidarity across all components of the federation and thereby to better serve the ultimate ideal of global distributive justice. Consequently, both a more effective pursuit of linguistic justice as equal dignity and the achievement of justice as equal opportunity on a higher scale may be welcome by-products of what may look at first sight, compared to Maskens’s original proposal, a second best option.

8. Territoriality against equal dignity?

Of all my critics, Helder De Schutter is the most radical. For unlike Alain Maskens and even Henry Tulkens, he flatly denies that a territorial regime is an appropriate way of pursuing justice as equal dignity.¹⁷ Or at least he accepts this only for a limiting and increasing rare Iceland-like case in which linguistic homogeneity is high at the start. By contrast, the standard case is now one of linguistic heterogeneity, where people with different native tongues share a territory that could not reasonably be cut up or cleaned up so as to create homogenous areas. And in this standard case, De Schutter (§1) argues, a plural regime that grants recognition to two or more languages with a significant presence would score far better in terms of justice as equal dignity than one that gives a privilege to just one. Moreover, even in a situation that is homogeneous at the start, thwarting people's preferences by constraining their choices of language use, in particular by preventing them from turning to a language they regard as more useful, or more prestigious, or more beautiful, would be a way of disrespecting their linguistic identity, which cannot simply be assumed to coincide with the mother tongue they happened to inherit. De Schutter's alternative pluralistic approach should have led to the adoption, throughout the country, of a bilingual regime of a type best approximated by the one currently obtaining in Brussels (§3). Such a regime offers no guarantee against one of the languages ending up displacing the other altogether. If this were to happen, De Schutter would be willing to call it a regrettable loss, but no injustice would be committed (§§ 2 and 3).

I fully subscribe to De Schutter's view that linguistic suicide is not *per se* an injustice: there is nothing like a right of survival for each existing language, nor a correlative duty for its speakers to keep it alive. Linguistic suicide can be perfectly consistent with equal dignity, though only on condition that linguistic communities themselves waive their right to territorial protection for their language because they are unwilling to bear the various dimensions of its cost (Van Parijs 2011: §5.14). However, they must first be given the option of using such a protection against the subversive maxi-min dynamics that would otherwise threaten justice as equal dignity along the three channels briefly listed above (§ 7) and spelt out at much greater length in my book (*LJ* §§ 5.3-5.5). I have no problem admitting that the introduction, strengthening or clarification of a territorial regime could threaten the equal dignity of people who identify with one or more languages distinct from the official language that is being protected. Equal dignity is safe, however, if we secure the satisfaction of a number of conditions which I wish to list here more systematically than I do in my book.

Firstly, the type and degree of coerciveness of the rules must not only comply with fundamental liberties — in particular the free choice of language in private interaction — but also be commensurate with what is needed to secure universal proficiency in the official local language. As mentioned earlier (§1) linguistic minorities can and should be given collective linguistic rights if granting them these rights involves no serious risk of trapping them in the ignorance of the official language. Secondly, the education and media systems must be so designed that proficiency in the official language is effectively accessible at an affordable cost (in money, time and effort) to all members (of learning age) of the linguistic minorities, whether newcomers or not. Thirdly, room must be made for transitional linguistic facilities, i.e. the granting of the same linguistic rights as before, in so far as practicable, to those stuck by surprise on the “wrong” side of the new (or more strictly interpreted) linguistic border, but not to newcomers or the newly born. Fourthly, those left unsatisfied by the coercive regime, even thus constrained by various obligations and softened by

¹⁷ See also his excellent earlier critique of the linguistic territoriality principle (De Schutter 2008), one of the very best philosophical discussions of the topic.

transitional facilities, must be at liberty to move out of the territory to which the new regime applies. Last but far from least, in order to have a response to the linguistic minorities protesting “What about our dignity?” (De Schutter §2), the background must be one of general reciprocity: you are expected to learn my language in this place just as I would have to learn yours wherever your language is official.

Bearing these conditions in mind, what may be found embarrassing for my equal-dignity case for territoriality is not linguistic heterogeneity per se, but those cases where the exit and reciprocity conditions are hard or even impossible to fulfil. This concerns minorities that have no linguistic homeland to which they could reasonably be told they have the option of moving.¹⁸ In those cases, it is not only the exit condition that becomes tricky, but the reciprocity condition then needs to be formulated in such a counterfactual way that it becomes far-fetched: “If there ever was a place in the world in which your linguistic community could and would implement a territorial protection of its language, and if I were to settle there, then I would muster the courage and humility to learn your language just as I expect you to do here for our language.” In *LJ* (§5.14), I recognize and discuss this difficulty. However, it is of precious little relevance to the linguistic issues that have been agitating us in Belgium. Francophones who dislike the local linguistic regime in Flanders do not need to travel far to get bilingual or pure francophone soil under their feet. Moreover, ever since the 1930s reciprocity is easily satisfied for both language groups within the country itself.

I should add that the more widely the equal-dignity-based rationale behind the territoriality principle is understood, the less coercive the regime will need to be. This understanding requires appreciating the full implications of the inexorable maxi-min dynamics, to which I believe De Schutter pays insufficient attention. Once the power of this mechanism is recognized, people on both sides of the linguistic divide should understand that the possible sources of Belgium’s deeply asymmetric bilingualism are not exhausted by the alternative suggested in Yves Leterme’s ill-fated *Libération* interview: if it is not the Francophones’ intellectual incapacity that accounts for their linguistic incompetence, he insinuated, it can only be their arrogant bad will.¹⁹ It is a third factor, the powerful yet diffuse operation of the maxi-min dynamics, that is the chief factor that helps create the asymmetry and that locks us in it. Sharing this insight should at one and the same time induce Flemings to show more understanding for the Francophones’ overall mediocre knowledge of Dutch and induce Francophones (and Helder De Schutter) to have more sympathy for the Flemings’ insistence on territorial coercion.

9. Europe’s trilingual capital

What follows from all this, Henry Tulkens (§3) legitimately asks, for today’s Belgium and in particular for Brussels and its periphery? I already gave several partial answers to this question, but I shall now integrate them into a fuller picture of the direction in which I claim we should move. I shall do so by listing and motivating briefly the main components of what I believe to be a feasible and desirable linguistic regime for the Brussels Region, its immediate surroundings and the rest of the country. The

¹⁸ For this reason, “continuity” is not an argument against territorial coercion (De Schutter §3), but rather in favour of it: the easier it is to move to one’s “linguistic homeland”, the less of a problem the coercion should be regarded as being. The failure to recognize French as official in Vlaams Brabant or Dutch in Brabant Wallon could be regarded as far less problematic, in this respect, than the failure to recognize Arabic, let alone Urdu or Lingala, in Brussels.

¹⁹ «Au départ, l'idée était que beaucoup de francophones allaient s'adapter à la nouvelle réalité linguistique. Mais apparemment les francophones ne sont pas en état intellectuel d'apprendre le néerlandais, d'où la prolongation de ce statut d'exception.» (Leterme 2006).

order followed does not reflect the chronological order in which these components should be put into place: we shall have to use any opportunity that arises in order to progress along each of the directions I shall sketch. Nor does the order reflect the relative importance I give to each component. Instead, it is dictated by the fact that some components of what I propose provide a background in the absence of which other components would be less realistic and/or less defensible.

First of all, the Brussels Region itself, wherever its borders are drawn, should be given an officially trilingual status, with English added to French and Dutch. This does not mean that English should be given exactly the same status as the other two languages. No need whatever, for example, to add a third linguistic version to every street name. But public communication and administrative procedures of all sorts and at all levels within the borders of the Region, must become possible in English as well as in French and in Dutch. As a result, it should become possible to get away with settling quite comfortably in Brussels without knowing either of the two local languages. This first component of what I propose can be interpreted as a further relaxation of the present-day bilingual regime. Some relaxation in this direction has already happened. For example, the use of English is predominant, sometimes even exclusive, in the huge posters publicly displayed by the European Commission on the Berlaymont building. It is also present, next to French and Dutch, in the Brussels public transport system. Moreover, in part of Brussels' public education system — namely the four and soon five European Schools funded by the European Commission and the governments of the member states —, pupils can graduate without having followed a single lesson in either French or Dutch.²⁰ My proposal is to extend and officialise such “facilities” for English in public communication and public education — including through the development of open and co-funded so-called type II European schools with English as one of the teaching languages — and to further extend them to the judiciary and, in due course, to political life.

Why this relaxation? As De Schutter (§1 fn1) rightly points out about the toleration of “linguistically free zones” in general, this cannot have anything to do with the pursuit of justice as equal dignity. Not only is it a concession that favours the use of a language that is not exactly vulnerable, but it is meant to benefit mostly people who do not have English as their mother tongue and do not identify with that language at all. According to the best data we have (Janssens 2007), people with English as their native language (or one of their native languages) form around 3% of the Brussels adult population and unlike people who speak it well (around 35% of adult Brusselers according to the same source), they will always remain a small minority. The justification for a move to official trilingualism has nothing to do with the dignity of Anglophones. It can be traced to the contingent fact that the government in charge of the first rotating presidency of the European Economic Community — Belgium, as it happens, because of the alphabetic order — had to find an improvised shelter for its first public servants in January 1958. From then on, Brussels grew step by step into the uncontested political capital of the European Union. This is a major historical responsibility, in the service of a daring, difficult, unprecedented project, of momentous importance for the effective pursuit of worldwide justice. Brussels would dishonour itself if it did not do its utmost to discharge it properly. And this has linguistic implications, which few would have anticipated in 1958.

What happened since is that the worldwide spreading of English, successive EU enlargements and the local operation of the maxi-min dynamics are working together to make English each day more dominant in interactions within and around the Brussels-based EU institutions. As argued at length

²⁰ Whatever their linguistic section, European School pupils need to choose one out of three languages — English, French or German — as a second medium of secondary education. In the Brussels schools, most of those who are not in the English section choose English as their second language.

elsewhere (*LJ*, chapter 1) and briefly restated above (§5), this is a trend to be welcomed and accelerated. Convergence towards a shared language is an essential condition for the European Union to function better and to become able to take over a number of functions which nation-states are no longer able to perform properly.²¹ Consequently, if Brussels is to be up to the job it happens to have been entrusted with, it will need to upgrade the official local status of the unofficial language of the European institutions. Some may understandably regret this, often in an emotional and narcissistic mood, but also sometimes, as with François Grin (§3), in a reflective and articulate way. The citizens and authorities of Brussels, however, should not waste any time on such regrets and rear guard battles. They must instead adjust proactively to the linguistic imperative inherent in Brussels' historical mission, in the interest of both the smooth working of the European Union and the prosperity of the local population.

10. An overflow tank for Brussels' expats

As argued by implication above (§7), the comparatively accommodating linguistic regime thus granted to the half per cent of Belgium's surface that counts as the capital of the European Union must not be regarded as freely expandable to the metropolitan area that surrounds Brussels. Those who choose to settle in this area must accept the possible inconvenience of having to learn the language of the region, whether Dutch or French. Europeans must be clearly told that although Brussels is, must be and will become more and more their capital, with the rights and duties this entails, Belgium as a whole is not and must never become their colony. As argued above (§§ 3 and 4), the fixity of the linguistic border is crucial. For this reason, the splitting of the B-H-V constituency, though not directly relating to the language regime, was understandably regarded on both sides as asserting the non-expandability of the area in which a more accommodating linguistic regime will prevail. This should hold for English no less than for French.

The implementation of this linguistic *carcan*, i.e. the linguistic integration of households settling on officially monolingual land beyond the borders of the accommodating Brussels Region, will not always be self-evident. It will constitute a challenge for both Flanders and Wallonia, but a more serious one for Flanders than for Wallonia for three reasons.²² Firstly, people coming directly from abroad are more likely to know at least some French than some Dutch. Secondly, far more Brusselers can speak French than Dutch — 96% versus 28% according to the most reliable data (Janssens 2007). And thirdly, Brussels being nested inside Flanders, its immediate periphery lies mostly in Flanders. The resulting challenge will prove unmanageable unless it is eased through the combination of two strategies.

Compared to the second, the first of these strategies is simple and cheap. It consists in including in the trilingual Region of Brussels Capital the six Flemish communes with facilities for French, thereby making these six communes just as accommodating as the Brussels Region itself in a clear, unambiguous way that does not breed confusion about the official monolingualism of Flemish Brabant. This is no infringement of the linguistic border fixity rule which I insisted (in §3 above and in

²¹ As is, for reasons fundamentally analogous, convergence towards a single political capital (see *LJ* chapter 1, fn14; and Van Parijs & Van Parijs 2010).

²² Striking evidence about the size of this challenge in Flemish Brabant was provided by recent data from the catholic school network showing that in several of the Flemish communes without facilities around Brussels, primary school pupils with Dutch as their mother tongue are on their way to becoming a majority (see "Massale instroom van Franstalige leerlingen in Vlaamse scholen", *De Morgen*, 25 August 2011, p.3).

LJ §5.2) is intrinsic to the territoriality principle.²³ In the 1962-63 deal that fixed the linguistic border, the linguistic facilities conceded to these six communes were not transitional facilities to be gradually phased out (of the sort recommended in §8 above and in *LJ* §5.12). It was then decided, laboriously but unambiguously, that these facilities would apply not just to the people who then lived in those communes, but also indefinitely to any newcomer or newly born. Half a century after the deal, street names are still and are meant to remain in both languages, and although the bulk of the current inhabitants of these communes lived elsewhere at the time or were not born, they are all entitled to exactly the same administrative and educational facilities as the people who were taken by surprise by the fixation of the border. No wonder, therefore, that the proportion of people with French as their only native language is nowadays on average higher in those communes than in the Brussels Region itself (see Janssens 2002). Those who were chanting “*Faciliteiten, stommiteiten!*” in 1962 were absolutely right if what they meant was that granting such permanent facilities would allow the “oil stain” to proceed unimpeded in these communes. But they were wrong in believing that this would be, in the long term, a bad thing for Flanders — just as the Francophones outraged a few years later at the prospect of the UCL being ejected from Leuven did not anticipate how good a thing this would turn out to be for Francophone Belgium. Let me explain.

One is now beginning to discover the new nature and size of the challenge presented by the implementation of the territorial regime in the Flemish communes to the East and South of Brussels, from St Stevens Woluwe to Hoeilaart via Tervuren and Overijse. In this opulent part of Flemish Brabant, the main problem will be less and less the unwillingness to learn Dutch by snooty Belgian Francophones. They are beginning to understand at long last that in Flanders even more than in Brussels it makes a lot of sense to make your children bilingual by sending them to a Dutch-medium school while transmitting French at home. In the years to come, the trouble will stem instead more and more from the swelling Brussels-based expat community, only a small minority of which can be expected to become actively interested in learning Dutch. As a striking illustration, take the huge forty-year old Tervuren-based British School, a powerful magnet for Anglophones in Flemish Brabant. Starting in September 2011, it is offering, next to the pure English-medium curriculum, a bilingual one. “Finally!”, some may cheer after hearing this, “at long last, these folk have realized that they are established in Flanders and understood the importance of showing respect for the local language”. But they will quickly have to shelve their enthusiasm: “bilingual”, it turns out, here means “English/French”.

The point thereby illustrated is that in order to prevent the territorial regime becoming either a joke or a nightmare in those communes, it is essential to provide sufficient living space to the growing number of foreign nationals who are as perfectly willing and able to integrate into Brussels as the EU capital as they are unwilling and unable to integrate into the Flemish or Walloon populations. Removing the remaining confusion by adding the six communes with facilities to the trilingual Brussels Region is an obvious way of enhancing the power of these communes as permanent magnets that will help release the pressure on the rest of Flemish Brabant.²⁴ If metaphors can help:

²³ For this reason, my proposal for the six communes does not “pave the way for further changes in future to the linguistic boundary in municipalities with comparable linguistic compositions” (Velaers §2). On the contrary, against the background of a “clean splitting” of the rest of the constituency of Halle-Vilvoorde, which I have long been supporting for precisely this reason (see e.g. Van Parijs 2007), the adjustment of the political border to the linguistic border which I advocate is bound to reduce remaining pressures to shift the latter outward, as explained below. By contrast, the systematic “pluralism in border areas” recommended by De Schutter (§3) along lines which Tulkens (2009) would certainly find congenial is exactly what would undermine what both Velaers and I find essential in a territorial regime.

²⁴ Without waiting for this to happen and Brussels to become officially trilingual, the Flemish government could show how clever and forward-looking it is by introducing administrative facilities for English in these communes, instead of stubbornly tarnishing its international reputation by multiplying skirmishes around the facilities granted to French.

such a small expansion of the Brussels Region does not amount to the construction of a corridor or the sowing of a *bretelle* that would hold together the two pieces of a *nation francophone* that will never exist. Rather, it provides a badly needed overflow tank for the exploding Brussels-based expat community.

What I am arguing for obviously constitutes a slight redrawing of the regional border. As explained above, this minor shift would not be a shift in the language border, but an alignment of the regional border on the language border. Nonetheless it implies that Flanders would be giving up an admittedly tiny but fairly crowded and affluent portion of its territory: about a third of one percent of its surface and slightly above one percent of its population. This will not mean much in terms of tax base: the taxable part of the incomes earned by the residents of these communes will keep shrinking, as it has been doing for years in the South-Eastern quarter of the Brussels Region, because the proportion of wealthy residents escaping partly or fully Belgian income taxation will keep rising. Nonetheless, it would be silly to deny that a concession is involved, for which a compensation must be sought as part of a broader package.

What this broader package should be is now obvious to me.²⁵ In order to provide the government of the German Community with a coherent bundle of competences, one needs to transfer to it the bulk of the so-called place-related (as opposed to person-related) competence, currently exercised by the Walloon Region in the nine German-speaking communes in the East of the province of Liège. This would be tantamount to transforming these communes into a full-fledged region of *Ostbelgien* and hence to removing from the Walloon region about five percent of its surface and two percent of its citizens, that is a population of about the same size as the population living in the six communes with facilities around Brussels and a territory seventeen times bigger. Creating this fourth region is obviously a more serious boundary change than the tiny shift involved in adding six smallish communes to Brussels. No one could seriously advocate the former while objecting to the latter on the ground that regional borders are sacrosanct. True, the creation of this fourth Region, through a fellow Germanic one, can hardly be packaged as a gift made by Wallonia to Flanders. But nor is the adding of the six communes to the trilingual region of Brussels-Capital a gift by Flanders to Wallonia. Fundamentally, both moves consist in the two large Regions giving up a small part of their territory and their population in the interest of a smoother, simpler and more transparent functioning of the

²⁵ I suggested earlier (Van Parijs 2007) a different deal, whereby the four smaller communes with facilities would join Brussels, while the two bigger ones (Rode and Wemmel) would see their facilities phased out. But I subsequently changed my mind (2010a, 2010c) because new facts and arguments persuaded me that there was a far more elegant and intelligent alternative. Firstly, the latest demographic data about these communes indicate that, in one of them at least (Kraainem) the number of Belgian citizens has started falling in both relative and absolute terms, and thereby suggest that the proportion of “Francophones” (in the sense of Belgian citizens with French as their mother tongue) may well have started declining. (This is not visible in election results, as analysed for example by Frees (2011), in part because a large proportion of the non-Belgians settling in these communes does not vote but above all because such results unavoidably use a lens that admits of only two colours and are therefore intrinsically unable to capture the novelty of the challenge.) Secondly, with the imminent opening of the fourth big European school in Laeken (scheduled for September 2012), Wemmel will need to serve as an overflow tank just as crucial for releasing the pressure on the Flemish communes to the North of Brussels as four of the other communes will remain for the East and South. Thirdly, the growing plausibility of turning the German-speaking Community into a full-fledged Region (see e.g. Vande Lanotte 2011) has drawn attention to a far greater alteration of regional borders sufficiently analogous to supply an evident counterpart. Finally and perhaps most decisively, I realized the political impossibility of differentiating the fates of these communes after forty years of shared official status and similar sociolinguistic dynamics. Both the Flemish and Francophone negotiators would face something like “Sophie’s choice” (the mother who arrives in Auschwitz and must decide whether her son or her daughter will be gassed): they would have to decide and justify which of their keen supporters they would save and which they would sacrifice — by letting them be engulfed by Brussels in one case, by abandoning them in Flemish hands in the other. Under the agreement reached between the negotiators in September 2011 on the splitting up of the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (unlike the confused *bricolage* concocted for the judiciary district), the asymmetry between all six communes and the rest of Flemish Brabant become deeper than ever, which further undermines the political plausibility of the deal I proposed earlier, while constituting another important further step in the direction I now advocate. The fruit may not be ripe enough for picking, but the ripening goes on.

linguistic dimension of our federation: the linguistic identity of each component will be sharpened and the implementation of the territorial regime will be made more effective and more sustainable.

II. Born-again Brusselers

In order to make the territorial regime manageable in Flanders, the slight expansion of trilingual Brussels here proposed will be far from superfluous. But it will not be sufficient. Even expanded by six communes, the Brussels Region remains very exiguous (0.7% of the country's surface, 61 times smaller than Flanders, 73 times smaller than Wallonia without Ostbelgien). Because of the linguistic *carcan*, people drawn to Brussels by its cosmopolitan function will tend to suburbanize less than would otherwise be the case, thereby helping preserve the central urban area from decay but also boosting housing costs within its borders. Combined with comparatively high local birth rates and an attractiveness to poor immigrants shared with most prosperous Northern cities, this will make it increasingly difficult for young people growing up in Brussels to find affordable accommodation in their ever more densely populated city. The problem for the Flemish periphery, therefore, will not just be the affluent expats unwilling to learn Dutch, but even more the far less affluent native Brusselers who will keep pouring out of the urban core. Whether they like it or not, Flemish communes will have to house many of these people, as no fence, no discriminatory law and no racist attitude will ever be able to prevent them from crossing the Brussels ring road in search of a place to live and bring up their children, not too far from where they grew up and from where they are likely to find work. Their integration will happen smoothly, in the interest of both themselves and the local population, only if enough of them will have acquired in Brussels, prior to moving into Flanders, an adequate level of competence in Dutch. Unfortunately, though probably higher than it has ever been in the 1000-year history of the city, the proportion of Brusselers who have more than a basic knowledge of Dutch as a second language is still very low.²⁶ For this reason, though not only for this reason, it is essential to boost dramatically the knowledge of Dutch by Brussels's home-grown population.²⁷

Is this possible? Yes, but only if there is enough humility to learn from elsewhere and enough boldness to innovate. Firstly, we must take the trouble to have a very close look at what is being done abroad: how can pupils in Luxembourg and in Barcelona achieve proficiency in the two (and even three) locally official languages, despite the large presence, in those cities not much less than in Brussels, of many children with none of the official languages as their native language?²⁸ Each situation is different, and straight transpositions seldom make much sense. But in order to avoid major blunders and in order to broaden our perception of what is feasible, there is nothing more fruitful than understanding what works, what does not work and why in places broadly similar to ours.

Secondly, partly in the light of the lessons to be drawn from what is being achieved elsewhere, we must dare to experiment and innovate. For example, we must take seriously ideas as radical as the

²⁶ See Janssens (2007). Both De Schutter (§2) and Van Velhoven (§2) suggest that the maintenance of Dutch in Brussels is largely due to the rights given to the Flemish inhabitants of Brussels, and hence to the accommodating (binary) pluralism that prevails in the Brussels Region, unlike the rest of Belgium. The possibility of having Dutch-language schools in Brussels (which would be ruled out under a coercive regime on behalf of the dominant language) is no doubt a necessary condition. But, combined with Flanders' relative prosperity, the firm territorial protection of Dutch in the immediate periphery of the tiny bilingual area is crucial: the steady fall in the number of native Dutch-speakers living in Brussels would not begin to be offset by the growth in the number of secondary Dutch speakers if no Dutch was needed to get a job and live comfortably all around Brussels. Paradoxically, the linguistic territoriality principle both sucks Flemings out of Brussels and turns non-Flemish Brusselers into competent Dutch speakers.

²⁷ Using the terminology of Lj §5.1, this would essentially amount to turning Brussels' coercive bilingual regime from a disjunctive one (less coercive than official monolingualism) into a conjunctive one (more coercive than official monolingualism).

²⁸ See Van Parijs (2010b) for a synthesis of the workshop organized on this topic by Aula Magna in May 2010.

proposal that all Brussels children should learn to read and write in Dutch, as is already happening in some immersion schools in Wallonia. Less radically, we must “responsibilize” the schools, networks or communities operating in Brussels for their contribution to the bilingualism of its population by making the level of their (ultimately federal) funding depend not only on the number of pupils they attract but also, through a handsome per capita bonus, on the number of these pupils who do not have the school language as their mother tongue (regardless of whether this mother tongue is one of the official languages). All this will be to no avail unless accompanied by vigorous measures to secure an adequate supply of teachers, especially native speakers of Dutch willing and able to come to Brussels and stay. The removal of absurd administrative obstacles to teaching in the schools of the other language regime may help. But more will be needed, such as an appropriate use of the large stock of publicly owned housing, in order to fix enough teachers with a profile in high demand, whether attracted from the other two regions or locally bred. Finally, school cannot do it all, and an intelligent synergy with Brussels-based media and cultural actors must help create virtuous circles of competence and contact that will enable children growing up in Brussels to practice their languages beyond school.

To facilitate this multidimensional innovation process, it would be of great help if the ultimate responsibility for the fair and efficient education of all young Brusselers were clearly allocated to the government of the Brussels Region, and if powers were accordingly transferred from the Communities. This will only happen, however, when there will be enough assurance that the regional authorities will not seize these new powers to squeeze Dutch out of the city as swiftly as possible, but on the contrary mobilize them to the full to disseminate competence in Dutch in the population more vigorously and effectively than has ever been the case in the history of the city. Not out of veneration for the Flemish literature or under pressure from Flemish nationalism, but in the first instance because it is in the interest of the children to whom they are politically responsible. Linguistic competence will be a core asset for the Brussels population as a whole and, whatever their other qualifications and sector of activity, for most of its individual members.²⁹ The chief lasting comparative advantage of the locals will be their ability to connect the increasingly cosmopolitan and English-using capital of the European Union with the two neighbouring regions in which Dutch and French will remain entrenched.

This obviously supposes that the locals should learn English too, as everyone else in Europe and beyond. With respect to English no less than with respect to the other national language, large-scale language acquisition will require a lot of imagination and innovation. One of the ways forward, already briefly mentioned (§9), is the development of open European Schools of type II, i.e. jointly funded by “Europe” and “Belgium” in proportion to the number of pupils who are versus are not children of EU civil servants.³⁰ But access to proficiency in English should not remain an elite feature. Providing it is sequenced in an intelligent way and providing spotless spelling and syntax are not regarded as meaningful objectives, the simultaneous learning of three languages is by no means a pipedream, if started early enough, with plenty of opportunities for practice both available (as they are in Brussels) and used (as they are far too little so far). Under these conditions, there is no reason why more English should come at the expense of other languages. No zero-sum anguish should inhibit progress towards sustainable widespread trilingualism. Competence in English will be essential to link up efficiently with the Brussels-based international institutions and community, while competence in the two main national languages will indispensable to be able to serve as links with the surroundings in

²⁹ See Mettewie and Van Mensel (2009) on the unsatisfied demand for bilingual and trilingual workers in the Brussels region.

³⁰ See Van Parijs (2010d) for a discussion of the potential of this formula and the obstacles it faces.

a way unavailable to outsiders. More important than any other investment, producing and reproducing a trilingual workforce will be Brussels' most productive investment in the decennia to come.³¹

This conception of the linguistic future of Brussels obviously requires, on the part of Brussels' Francophone majority a sharp break away from the attitude that has been prevailing until recently and from the rear guard battles it keeps feeding. As regards English, the frustration and resentment about French having been irreversibly dislodged from the top position in and around the European institutions must give way to an active appropriation of English as a tool for cross-border communication and mobilization — and to a feeling of relief about the fact that the language that emerged as the global lingua franca happens to be so closely related to French. The change of attitude towards Dutch is even more important. Instead of looking down at Dutch as a remnant of Brussels's remote past, instead of resisting it as a language which the few true Flemings left in Brussels rigidly insist on using, instead of seeing in it no more than an idiom one is obliged to learn for purely utilitarian reasons, Francophone Brusselers are well advised to value it as they have never done before. As eight of them put it in a recent opinion piece: "Our education endowed us with a deep bond with Francophone culture and the French language. But the Flemish culture and the Dutch language are and must remain equally important components of the Brussels identity. Very far from wanting to eradicate Dutch from Brussels, we believe it is of capital importance for the future of young Brusselers, whatever their origins, that they should learn Dutch incomparably better than their elders, that they should be proud of being able to speak it, that it should be part of what they are." (Borlée & al. 2011). While gradually making its way through the intellectual and cultural elites, this new attitude needs to percolate far more widely. It is essential not only to generate the political will to introduce the policies needed to spread trilingualism, but also to help motivate Brusselers of all ages to learn Dutch as well as English in addition to French³². Contempt is just a cheap excuse for ignorance and laziness. It needs to give way to respect and appreciation.

By fostering the democratization of trilingualism, the attitude thus advocated fits as a core element in a strategy for preventing jobs in and around Brussels from being snapped by youngsters from Flemish or Walloon Brabant currently more trilingual in the above sense than the average youth growing up in Brussels. It also fits in with an inclusive and forward-looking Brussels patriotism of the sort first explicitly articulated, perhaps, in the December 2006 call "Nous existons/ Wij bestaan/ We exist".³³ This patriotism is quite distinct, I dare presume, from the "Brussels nationalism" which Van Velthoven (§2) claims "will damage the future existence of Belgium more than the separatist thinking of Flemish-nationalist parties". The development of the inclusive patriotism I advocate for the capital of Europe will certainly blow up any lingering hope that Belgium will ever be held together through the con-domination of Brussels by Flanders and Wallonia. But no harm is being done here: colonial dreams should be ditched forever. By contrast, there is no reason to believe that a Brussels patriotism that honours, indeed cherishes both of the languages that link it to Belgium's two larger regions should damage the federation rather than strengthen it.

³¹ Trilingualism in the sense used so far clearly means, for a significant proportion of the Brussels population, quadrilingualism or more. The consistent domestic use and intergenerational transmission of immigrant languages must be strongly encouraged, both as a way of recognizing the value of an important dimension of residents of foreign origin and as a way of preserving an important economic asset. The hundreds of languages that are being practiced daily in Brussels home must be cherished for themselves but also valued as a mutually beneficial links with many places around the world. Relative to French, Dutch and English, however, including them in the curriculum is not a priority and can be counterproductive.

³² See Laurence Mettwie's (2004, 2011) research showing how the effectiveness of language learning is affected by the psychological attitude towards it.

³³ See <http://www.brusselsvoice.be/en/node/831> for the text of this call and the list of the ten thousand or so Brusselers who signed it.

12. The linguistic dilemma of Belgian democracy

The previous three sections should have gone a long way towards meeting Henry Tulkens's (§3) request for a fuller picture of how I see the linguistic future of Brussels and its periphery. This picture may even turn out to be closer to his own view than he expected. But I am not quite done yet. Before closing, I need to add a few words about the linguistic future of the other components of the federation, and in particular about how the monolingual territorial regime that applies and, in my view, should apply to them can be compatible with a sensible running of our federal democracy.³⁴ For no democracy can function, it seems, without enough people from all corners of the demos being capable of talking to each other. No Belgian democracy can function without at least the elites in Flanders and Wallonia being able to communicate with each other. As Van Velthoven (§2) rightly notes, "for a very long time Flanders kept Belgium linguistically together". In recent years, however, competence in French has been declining quickly among the Flemish elite, in part because of competition with English but also because Flemings feel that it should not be up the country's linguistic majority, especially now that it has become the more affluent of the two communities, to make the effort of learning the language of the minority. On the other side of the border, despite the widely publicized emergence of a couple of hundreds of schools with immersion classes that cater for a tiny subset of Francophone pupils, it cannot be said that great efforts are being deployed. Whereas every Flemish child has French lessons from the fifth year of primary school onwards, those Walloon kids who do learn Dutch only do so seriously at secondary school, and many do not have any Dutch at all.³⁵ Any outside observer is bound to find it weird that the part of Belgian population that views itself and is perceived by others to be the one more attached to the existence of Belgium should expect to get away with learning so poorly the language of the country's majority?

Against this background, how can one secure the linguistic preconditions for the viability of Belgian democracy? There are two options. One consists in both Flanders and Wallonia living up to the European Union's proclaimed ideal of "mother tongue plus two", i.e. competence in (at least) one other non-native language in addition to English, in this case the second national language.³⁶ For most parts of the European Union, this is likely to remain wishful rhetoric. But possibly not in Flanders, where the proportion of the population that is (self)reported to speak English and French at more than a basic level exceeds 50%.³⁷ Can this be sustained and improved? Certainly for English: average competence grows quickly every year, as younger cohorts replace older ones. But possibly also for French, providing policies and circumstances prevent the maxi-min dynamics from

³⁴ I am not talking here about the survival conditions of the country. As noted before (§6), Belgium's territorial regime does create centrifugal and, at the limit, separatist pressures. But as I and many others have had other opportunities to explain, the guarantee of survival of the country follows neither from mutual affection nor from common nationhood but from the double fact that neither of the two main regions is willing to quit Belgium without Brussels, nor able to quit Belgium with Brussels. See e.g. Van Parijs (2011d) for one succinct explanation addressed to a foreign audience, and Barry (2001: 312) for one foreigner's snappy and unsympathetic, yet insightful summary: "But the endless process of haggling that is Belgian politics is so nauseating to all concerned that it is widely thought that the country would already have broken up if it were not for the problem posed by Brussels, a Francophone enclave in Flemish territory that is too big a prize for either side to be willing to relinquish."

³⁵ In 1998, the teaching of one foreign language (Dutch, English or German) was introduced in the last two years of primary school with two hours per week, but this subject is no part of the requirements for obtaining the primary school degree (C.E.B.). Pupils in the professional sections of secondary schools of the French community do not have any compulsory foreign language course at all, which means that many Walloon children (who do not have Dutch in primary school) graduate without having followed a single Dutch lesson. In technical and general sections, there is usually a choice between Dutch and English as first foreign language, and only in some cases the possibility of a second foreign language, with far less hours. (For further details, see Blondin & al. 2008.) In 2009-10, among the pupils who have to take a foreign language in the first year of secondary school, 46% choose Dutch, with big sub-regional differences between, for example, over 80% in Brabant wallon and less than 30% in Liège or Luxembourg (Gérard 2011).

³⁶ See the report of the commission chaired by Amin Maalouf (2008).

³⁷ See the appendix to the lead piece of this volume (graph 7).

squeezing it out: the learning of French must keep preceding the learning of English at school, France must remain a top holiday destination for Flemings and French citizens must not develop too enthusiastically the capacity and desire to speak English. Of these three conditions, only the second can be assumed to be safe (barring dramatic climate change), but it is of precious little French-learning use if the other two are not satisfied.

What about Wallonia? The challenge is far greater. Not only do most Walloons, unlike all Brusselers, live quite a long distance from any significant concentration of Dutch native speakers. In addition, the operation of the maxi-min criterion will make French prevail in most conversations with Dutch-speaking Belgians and English prevail in most conversations with Dutch citizens. Unavoidably, this will badly affect the chance of ever practicing Dutch and hence both the motivation and opportunity to improve and maintain it. In such a context, democratizing competence in Dutch would require considerable resources. In particular, it would require placing the learning of Dutch at an early stage in the curriculum, before the learning of English. And it would require attracting a large number of native speakers of the Flemish variety of Dutch who would be willing to teach in Walloon schools despite a wage level lower than in Flemish schools. And all this would need to happen with tight budgets and rigid hiring rules. What is quite realistic in Brussels, providing the local linguistic wealth is intelligently harnessed, looks hopelessly out of reach in Wallonia, especially as the irresistible general rise in the knowledge of English will tend to evict Dutch from inter-Belgian conversations in which it could otherwise have had a chance given the declining proficiency in French in Flanders' upper strata. This does not mean that nothing could or should be done in Wallonia. Indeed, the data suggest that the proportion of young Walloons that will end up knowing Dutch well or very well by the end of their learning period will be higher than it has ever been in the history of the country.³⁸ But to make competence in Dutch a widely shared feature of the Walloon population, someone would need to find a way out of the apparently insuperable obstacles just described.

Is there an alternative worth pondering about? Perhaps.³⁹ It would consist in acknowledging that in all three regions English has irreversibly become the second most widely known language, and that the younger people are the wider the gap between their average competence in English and their average competence in the second national language. In light of the most relevant data available, it can even be safely conjectured that English will have overtaken both French and Dutch as Belgium's most widely known language when the youngest cohort of adults will have completed their language learning period.⁴⁰ Could Belgian democracy function through a medium distinct from the native languages of nearly all its citizens? This is exactly what we are expecting from most sub-Saharan African countries. So, why could we not expect it from ourselves? Perhaps because our strongly autonomous regions do function in local languages. But what about Indian Union? In most of its states, the democratic system functions in an official language different from the two languages that enable communication at the level of the Union as a whole. Here too we should take the trouble to look more than a few miles beyond our borders and more than a few years beyond our time. What is unimaginable nonsense or scandalous heresy for parts of the old elites⁴¹ may already be self-evident to

³⁸ See the appendix to the lead piece of this volume (graph 8).

³⁹ Along these lines, see Bruno De Wever (2010: 38): "Increasingly, English is becoming the lingua franca in the world and also in Europe. It may be wondered whether this offers the perspective for a future Belgium in which English will be a common medium for communication in well-defined fields, such as federal politics. Or is there a perspective hidden in the more mental shifts, which may effect an increase in the willingness of French speakers to learn Dutch? Maybe space will thus be created for bilingualism imposed by the authorities for anybody whose ambition is a social position anywhere in the country. »

⁴⁰ See the appendix to the lead piece of this volume (graph 4).

⁴¹ As revealed, for example, by some hostile reactions to the use of English as the sole medium of communication in the Re-bel initiative.

segments of the new ones.⁴² Moving in this direction would definitely infringe versions of the territorial regime more rigid than the one I defend (see the discussion with Grin in §5). But let us keep in mind that territoriality is not synonymous with local monolingualism. Whether in Belgium, in the Europe Union or beyond, no democracy will be able to do a decent job without shared proficiency in a language that does not coincide, for many people, with the language protected in the region where they live.

Even in this second scenario, I hasten to say, wider and better knowledge of the second national language would by no means become redundant. It would definitely go some way towards meeting the demands of the opponents of the *tout à l'anglais* and the hopes encapsulated in the EU's slogan "Mother tongue plus two". More importantly, there are many things that can be achieved thanks to knowing the language of the other that could not be achieved through the channel of a shared lingua franca. Proficiency in the latter is no adequate substitute for the ability to follow directly the debates conducted in the other national language, whether face to face in the media, nor for the ability to address members of the other linguistic group directly in their own language. Speaking the other's mother tongue is a way of proving respect and breeding trust. It is therefore a major asset in the service of persuasion and a major contribution to the healthy functioning of a democracy. In the second scenario, competence in the other national language will therefore remain of great importance. But whereas competence in English is bound to spread throughout society in Belgium as elsewhere, good competence in French will become more and more of an elite feature in Flanders while competence in Dutch will remain the privilege of an elite in Wallonia, though hopefully a less tiny one than today. Only the exceptional sociolinguistic conditions that prevail in Brussels, if used far more vigorously and intelligently than now by the authorities responsible to its population, can justify a realistic hope for democratized trilingualism.

This brief tentative exploration of what seems to me the more promising of the two scenarios closes my sketch of what I believe Belgium's linguistic future can be, must be and will be. This sketch was guided at the same time by the values I believe in and by what I have learned from many friends and colleagues speaking different languages and practicing different disciplines, not least the six other contributors to the present volume. It is in the essence of such a sketch that it should be revisable in the light of further evidence and insights. But a coherent, explicit picture of where we are going and need to go is essential to guide our steps. As neatly put in a very similar context by the very first author who bothered to address systematically the challenge of multilingual democracy: "*Ohne weite Gesichtspunkte kein naher Erfolg, ohne theoretische Einsicht kein sicherer, praktischer Vorschlag!*"⁴³

⁴² As illustrated, for example, by the SHAME demonstration (subtitle: "No government, great country") or by initiatives such as Hackdemocracy (<http://hackdemocracy.org>).

⁴³ "*Without remote perspectives no immediate success, without theoretical insight, no certain, practical proposal.*" (Renner 1918: 38). Karl Renner was one of the main Austrian social-democratic thinkers and leaders (he became prime minister in the interbellum and first president of the Austrian Republic after World War II). In a book first published before the World War I, he rejected the linguistic territoriality principle and advocated for the Austrian Empire a non-territorial form of federalism based on eight linguistically defined nations (see LJ § 5.5). The quotation is taken from the beginning of the second edition of this book. Although Renner's substantive view is fundamentally different from mine, I find the justification he gives for bothering to elaborate it highly congenial and of more general relevance to much of what we academics can contribute to politics. Here is the fuller passage: "*Wir unternehmen im gewöhnlichen Leben keinen Weg ohne Ziel, ausser um zu lustwandeln. Die politische Spaziergängerei muss auch bei uns ein Ende nehmen. Darum ist nichts aktueller als diese unreale, unaktuelle, ferne, utopische Endergebnis, als diese scheinbar theoretischen Grundsätze, Postulate, Tendenzen, die den Leser so leicht ermüden! Erst aus ihnen können wir leitende Gesichtspunkte für unser nächstes Handeln und ein Urteil über die Zweckmässigkeit unserer Augenblicksvorkehrungen ableiten... Ohne weite Gesichtspunkte kein naher Erfolg, ohne theoretische Einsicht kein sicherer, praktischer Vorschlag!*"

References

- Barry, Brian. 2001. *Culture and Equality*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Blondin, Cristiane, Annick Fagnant & Christelle Goffin. 2008. "L'apprentissage des langues en Communauté française: curriculum, attitude des élèves et auto-évaluation", *Education-Formation* 289, 73-92.
- Borlée, Jacques, Etienne de Callataÿ, Eric De Keuleneer, Alain Deneef, Serge Fautré, Henri Goldman, Philippe Van Parijs, Fatima Zibouh, « Pas en notre nom! ... et pour les francophones la même chose », in *Le Soir*, 25/02/11, p.14 ; and in *De Standaard*, 25/02/11, p.20. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8610.
- Cheshire, Paul C. 2010. "Why Brussels needs a City-Region for the City", in J.F Thisse & al., *What does geography teach us about the future of Belgium's institutions?*, Brussels, Re-Bel e-book n°7, November 2010, 38-48. Downloadable from www.rethinkingbelgium.eu.
- De Knop, Paul. 2011. « Waaron Engels belangrijk is voor de Vlaamse universiteit », *De Morgen* 6/10/11, p.22.
- De Schutter, Helder. 2008. « The Linguistic Territoriality Principle — A Critique », *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 25(2), 105-20.
- De Wever, Bruno. 2010. « From Belgian Nation State to Nations in Belgium: Past, Present and Future », in *What does history teach us about the future of Belgium's institutions?* (B. De Wever ed.), Re-Bel e-book n°6, October 2010, 32-38. Downloadable from www.rethinkingbelgium.eu.
- Eeckhout, Jan. 2011. "Brussel: economisch luik", VIVES Seminarie, Leuven, 16 juni 2011.
- Frees, Wout. 2011. "Electoral verfransing van de Vlaamse Rand rond Brussel: feit of fictie?", K.U.Leuven: VIVES, 22p.
- Gérard, Laurent. 2011. "L'anglais creuse l'écart sur le néerlandais", *La Libre Belgique*, 11/10/11.
- Grin, François. 2005. "L'anglais comme lingua franca: questions de coût et d'équité. Commentaire sur l'article de Philippe Van Parijs", *Économie publique* 15, 33-41.
- Grin, François. 2011. Interview with Flavia Frangini, in *Lingua Franca: Chimera or Reality?*, European Commission: DG Translation, 59-70. Downloadable from <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/lingua-franca-pbHC3111001>.
- Janssens, Rudi 2002. "Taalgebruik in de faciliteitengemeenten", in *Taalfaciliteiten in de Rand* (J. Koppen, B. Distelmans & R. Janssens eds.), Brussels : VUB Press, 2002, 283-339.
- Janssens, Rudi. 2007. *Van Brussel gesproken. Taalgebruik, taalverschuivingen en taalidentiteit in het Brussels hoofdstedelijk gewest*. Brussels: VUB Press.
- Leterme, Yves. 2006. « D'un Etat unitaire à un Etat fédéral », entretien avec Jean Quatremer, *Libération*, 18 août 2006.
- Maalouf, Amin et al. 2008. *A Rewarding Challenge. How the Multiplicity of Languages Could Strengthen Europe*. Brussels: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/doc/maalouf/report_en.pdf.

- Maskens, Alain. 2000. *Monoflamands et monowallons? Errances et dangers des ideologies mono-identitaires*, Paris & Bruxelles: La Longue Vue.
- Maskens, Alain. 2004. *Bruxelles et les faux-semblants du fédéralisme belge*. Rhode St Genèse: Le Roseau vert.
- Mettewie, Laurence. 2004. *Attitudes en motivatie van taalleerders in België*. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, doctoraatsthesis, downloadable from http://www.fundp.ac.be/recherche/publications/page_view/57219/.
- Mettewie, Laurence. 2011. “Bilinguisme, vous avez dit bilinguisme? U zei? Tweektaligheid?», presentation at the Journée du bilinguisme/ dag van de tweektaligheid, Ministry of the Brussels Region, 26 September 2011.
- Mettewie, Laurence & Van Mensel, Luk. 2009. “Multilingualism at all costs. Language use and language needs in business in Brussels”, in *Sociolinguistica 23: Language choice in European companies* (C. Truchot & U. Ammon eds.). Tübingen: Niemeyer & de Gruyter, 131-149.
- Renner, Karl. 1918. *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen, in besonderer Anwendung auf Oesterreich*, Leipzig & Wien: Franz Deuticke. (Revised edition of *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat*, Leipzig & Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1902.
- Stojanovic, Nenad. 2010. ‘Une conception dynamique du principe de territorialité linguistique. La loi sur les langues du canton des Grisons’, *Politique et Sociétés* 29(1), 231–59.
- Tulkens, Henry. 2009, “Institutional design for the Brussels area and values for the Belgian community”, *Brussels Studies* 26, May 2009, downloadable from <http://www.brusselsstudies.be>.
- Van Dyck, Kris & Vera Celis. 2011. “Naderlands aan de Free University of Brussels”, *De Morgen*, 8/10/11, p.19.
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 2005. “L'anglais lingua franca de l'Union européenne : impératif de solidarité, source d'injustice, facteur de déclin?», *Economie publique* 15, 13-32. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8609.
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 2007. “Réforme de l'Etat: en avant!”, *Le Soir*, 23/8/07, p.15; and « Staatshervorming: vooruit! », *De Standaard*, 23/8/07, p.16. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8610.
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 2010a. « BHV: Place à la sagesse et à l'ambition », *Le Soir*, 29/4/10; and « Wijsheid en ambitie voor ons land », *De Morgen*, 27/4/10, p. 21. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8610.
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 2010b. « Comment réussir l'école plurilingue? L'enseignement du Luxembourg et de Barcelone face au défi linguistique », synthèse du séminaire Aula Magna, www.aula-magna.eu, août 2010. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8610.
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 2010c. “Un bon compromis?», *Le Soir*, 23 octobre 2010, p.35; and « De nobele kunst om een goed compromis te sluiten » in *De Morgen*, 23/10/10, p.18. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8610.
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 2010d « Multiplier les écoles européennes à Bruxelles: deux conditions à remplir pour ne pas se contenter d'en rêver », in *Cahiers du GRASPE (Groupe de Réflexion sur l'avenir du Service Public Européen)* 15, 38-44. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8610.

Van Parijs, Philippe. 2011a. *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (abbreviated as *LJ* in the references).

Van Parijs, Philippe. 2011b. *Just Democracy: The Rawls-Machiavelli Programme*, Colchester: ECPR Press.

Van Parijs, Philippe. 2011c. Interview with Flavia Frangini, in *Lingua Franca: Chimera or Reality?*, European Commission: DG Translation, 81-91. Downloadable from <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/lingua-franca-pbHC3111001>.

Van Parijs, Philippe. 2011d. “La Belgique est-elle coupable (en trois)?”, *Libération*, in *Libération* (Paris) 14/06/11, p.25; also in *Le Soir* 14/06/11, p.15; and as « Omdat Brussel ons Jeruzalem is. Is de Belgische natie een anachronistisch verzinsel? », in *De Standaard* 14/06/11. Downloadable from www.uclouvain.be/8610.

Van Parijs, Philippe & Van Parys, Jonathan. 2010. “Brussels, capital of Europe: a sustainable choice?”, *Brussels Studies* 38, May 2010, downloadable from <http://www.brusselsstudies.be>.